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FROM the information available as we go to press the significant fact about the sinking of the Algonquin is that the Germans have put into effect their threat to sink American ships without warning. It is *the* overt act if ever there could be one. The answer it calls for is two-fold: a call to Congress assembling it as soon as it is physically possible to do so, and an announcement by the President, pending congressional action, that in all matters within the jurisdiction of the executive he will henceforth practise a frankly and thoroughly differential neutrality against Germany.

REPORTS from members of the Gerard party show pretty plainly that for Germany the crisis of the war will be worked out between now and July when the new harvest begins. All the little signs indicate that the official classes are counting up what they can save rather more than what they can win. The picture does not show a proud unconquerable Germany; it shows a Germany struggling desperately against its fears to preserve

its morale. With further Allied success in the Near East, with a plain demonstration of superiority in the West, the year 1917 promises to be the blackest in the history of the German Empire. But it would be folly not to recognize the ominous signs in the Allied countries. What is happening in Russia looks extraordinarily like a revolution accompanied by military inactivity along the eastern front. The presence of Lord Milner in Russia must be taken to have some political bearing on the steadiness of the Alliance. From Italy no news comes at present, but apparently well authenticated reports about the recent Rome conference show a latent national egoism in Italy which threatened serious disruption in the Balkans and the Mediterranean generally. In France there is another very serious cabinet crisis. In Britain the crystallization of an opposition to the victory government of Mr. Lloyd George is being avoided only with the very greatest difficulty. Finally there is the very significant effort to draw China into the war. Every nation is playing its last trumps and everywhere morale is being sustained only with the most heroic effort. It is too early to make prophecies. It is not too early to say that this process of cracking up is due to conditions so fundamental that while it may be checked a little it cannot be stopped altogether.

BAGDAD fallen has much more than a sentimental significance. It is a landmark in the progress of the British design to place a final quietus upon Germany's Levantine ambitions. In an ultimate sense, the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, with its potential agricultural and mineral resources looming vastly greater in German statesmen's calculations than in the reality, was the cause of the world war. Serbia had to be reduced to vassalage, Russia had to be driven out of Balkan politics, not because the Balkans are valuable in themselves, but because they lie on the road to Bagdad. If the war had ended last December, with the status quo reestablished on all European

frontiers, Germany would have regarded the war as won. The prize of Mesopotamia would have remained to German designs, and the fear of God and of the Kaiser would have been thrown into the hearts of any Balkan nation that might have sought to block the way. But now the prize is being torn to pieces by the British invader. The war might end leaving Germany paramount in the Balkans. If the British succeed in consolidating their conquests in Mesopotamia, Germany would still have lost, gaining nothing but a stony cul de sac.

DURING the last session of Congress the House, without accepting the responsibility of a roll-call vote, rejected a proposal to extend the civil service to postmasterships of the first, second and third classes. By a vote of 42 to 30 the Senate took a similar stand. Now, in the face of this sentiment, the Postmaster-General announces that after April first the President will fill vacancies in the higher postmasterships by appointing the candidate making the best grade in an examination. The organic Civil Service act provides that "no person who has been nominated for confirmation by the Senate shall be required to be classified or to pass an examination, unless by direction of the Senate." But there is nothing to prevent the President from using any method he chooses in selecting a candidate, before the nomination is made. This is now the custom in the case of consular appointments. Its extension will result in continuing in office many Democratic postmasters undesirable to new Democratic senators, and even in the appointment of Republican candidates. The action of the President is thus a challenge to the practice of senatorial courtesy. It is the first and long expected step that he has taken in the direction of administrative reform. Behind any attack on senatorial courtesy all progressive sentiment should be united.

DR. HECKSCHER'S declaration in the Reichstag that America's attitude towards Germany is laying the basis for a new grouping of the powers, with America and England on the one side and Germany, Russia and Japan on the other is quite in harmony with much international speculation on this side of the Atlantic. Whether we drive Germany into it or not, there is excellent reason why she should come to an understanding with Russia after the war. Russia is the greatest and richest field of industrial exploitation in the world, and German enterprise will bring all possible pressure to bear in favor of friendly political arrangements between the two countries. On geographical grounds, Japan is forced to do her utmost to maintain friendly relations with Russia.

But there is an obvious reason why these neutral relations between the three Powers can not develop into an offensive and defensive alliance against America and England. The future of Japan is even more dependent upon the development of her ocean-carrying trade than upon the guaranty of her position in China afforded by the treaty with Russia. Without a tremendous development of ocean shipping, Japan can not hope to profit materially from her Chinese venture, or to raise her population out of all but universal poverty. Japan must therefore keep on good terms with the Power or Powers that command the seas, and unless England is isolated and crushed by the submarine campaign, an Anglo-American combination will for an indefinite period be able to sweep hostile commerce off the seas.

COLOMBIA may have a legitimate grievance against the United States, yet the pending treaty, which aims to wipe out that grievance with a lump sum, may not be the best conceivable way of handling the situation. The wound inflicted upon Colombia's national honor is not likely to be healed by a cash payment fixed by our government. And the worst of it is that the acceptance of such a payment by Colombia might delude us with the belief that wounds to national honor may be healed in this way. If we have a right to be in Panama at all—and nobody is proposing to restore Colombia's lost province—it is under some principle of international eminent domain. The employment of this principle always implies compensation for material losses suffered, as fixed by an impartial tribunal. It would seem that the analogy holds in this case. If the present treaty fails we ought to negotiate a new treaty stipulating that all material damages to Colombia flowing from our action in Panama shall be assessed against us by an impartial board of arbitrators. Such a method would preserve Colombia's sense of dignity from outrage and would check any tendency on our part to boast of our generosity. Colombia would get what is her due, much or little, and we should pay merely what we owe. At the same time we should be advancing the cause of international arbitration among American nations.

CARRANZA, transformed from self-appointed First Chief to duly elected President under the new Mexican Constitution, ought to be a warning to those who prophesy about Mexico from this side of the Rio Grande. Let us recall the absolute demonstration of two years ago that Carranza would never succeed in establishing even a military domination over a tolerably pacified Mexico. And then the demonstration that if Car-

ranza attained to an uncertain military domination, at the first sign of a weakening toward civil legitimacy his power would crumble and the First Chief-tainship would be the prize for which multitudinous selfish and arrogant aspirants would strive by arms? Well, Carranza has been elected, no doubt by methods that still fall somewhat short of the democratic ideal, like election methods elsewhere. To judge from available information Carranza's election was infinitely more orderly, infinitely more in accord with the popular will, than any other presidential election ever held in Mexico. Carranza is not thereby guaranteed to be a "strong man," but he is plainly a much stronger man than his critics in the United States ever admitted. It is not proved that Carranza's policies will be found to be precisely what Mexico needs, but we may rest comfortably in the conclusion that Mexico is more contented under Carranza than she would be under any leader foreign interests might choose for the nation.

GERMAN eagerness for the reaffirmation and amendment of the Prussian-American treaty of 1798 appears to require no recondite explanation. As the treaty stands it assures the nationals of one country resident in the other the same freedom in time of war as in time of peace, to live and conduct their business unmolested. It assures the private property belonging to the nationals of the enemy country immunity against sequestration and confiscation. Shipping enjoys under the treaty the same immunity as other private property. Now, we have a few hundred of our nationals in Germany whom we greatly desire to protect against the kind of disgraceful abuse that German officialdom thought it expedient to inflict upon the Yarrowdale prisoners. Germany has hundreds of thousands of her nationals here. We have property interests in Germany, representing perhaps one per cent of the German property interests here. We have no ships in German harbors; Germany has an enormously valuable volume of tonnage in our harbors. Why shouldn't Germany press for a reaffirmation of the treaty amended so as to make it easier for her to escape certain restrictions upon her own action? And why should we entertain even for a moment the German suggestion? Treaty or no treaty, we do not want to intern the Germans in America or rob them of their property. If we make war, it will be upon a violent and lawless state, not upon its innocent and inoffensive citizens, who happen to be resident among us. At the same time we do not want any new and skilfully drafted protocol to interfere with our freedom of action in suppressing plots that are as prejudicial to the interests of the

great honorable majority of German nationals here as to our own interests.

THE obduracy of Irish national sentiment is an unpalatable fact that faces the British government of to-day. In the excitement at the beginning of the war there was an overwhelming sentiment in Ireland in favor of the Allies, an unqualified offer from John Redmond to sink Irish differences and a pledge of loyalty in recruiting that his own son and brother were prompt to redeem. The failure to avail of this sentiment and the actual slighting of it by British junkerdom are contributing facts to the estrangement that Mr. Redmond has avowed. The first appointment of Sir Edward Carson to the Cabinet was considered an affront to nationalist Ireland, and there was a brutal one-sidedness about the executions, the deportations, the martial law and the white-washing of military murders which reopened every Irish wound. For years extremist parliamentary candidates have been negligible in Ireland, but the recent Roscommon bye-election discloses an extraordinary reversal of Irish popular feeling by giving Count Plunkett two votes to the regular Home Rule candidate's one. To this intensification of national sentiment the Home Rule party has at last responded. Any slight chance that existed of substituting federalism for nationalism has gone glimmering, and while the Irish may be renewing a ruinous contest they have Lloyd George's word for it that they are obeying pride and self-respect in insisting that Irish nationality has its rights.

CONGRESSMEN who rest easier because even the most diminutive expenditures of the people's money are in the hands of the people's representatives may witness an effect of their system in a recent adventure of the Council of National Defense. Created by Congress "for the coördination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare," this body is at the present time in a position of the highest responsibility. A week ago it sought to buy a dictionary—and discovered that although Congress had set aside two hundred thousand dollars for its maintenance, none of that sum had been appropriated for the purchase of books. The Council will doubtless secure its dictionary, but it will be by virtue of private enterprise. Gradually common sense will discard the illogical idea that being "the direct representatives of the people" in any wise fits a vast legislative body for the intelligent handling of administrative detail. Less absurd but more important inconveniences arise constantly in many administrative bodies of our government.

IN a minority report the Republican members of the Senate Committee on Finance branded the Democratic revenue bill as "unjust, discriminatory, and sectional." Its provisions for surplus income and increased inheritance taxes were "the unscientific methods" made necessary by "the wild, reckless extravagance of the Democratic party." The Congressional Record shows that the Republicans went further than a minority report, and carried their criticism to the floor of the Senate. One page of the Record for last week reads as follows:

[Mr. Sherman addressed the Senate. His speech will be published hereafter.]

[Mr. McCumber addressed the Senate. His speech will be published hereafter.]

[Mr. Penrose addressed the Senate. His speech will be published hereafter.]

Mr. Brandegee: Mr. President, I think we ought to adjourn. There are only ten Senators on the floor, and it is nearly seven o'clock.

Though we do not speak for the Democratic Senators or their revenue bill, the debate on national finance might be simmered down still further:

[The Republicans attacked the measure. Their speeches will not appear in time to influence the voting, but will be published soon enough to take advantage of the franking privilege.]

The Effect of America in the War

WITH the shadow of war upon us, it is pertinent to inquire what American intervention would mean. It would extend the area of the war, to be sure. The one remaining great white space on the map would be dyed red. The pacifists are perfectly justified in their insistence that, *prima facie*, this fact is ominous. But unless we have so whipped our nerves as to make them react mechanically and uniformly to the word war, we shall not be content to rest with surface indications. If we are forced to abandon our neutrality, we shall still not be injecting war into a world otherwise peaceful. We shall be applying our forces toward the solution of a war problem antecedently existing. What the sincere internationalist is compelled to ask himself is not whether American blood will mingle with the rivers already wasting Europe, but whether it will increase the inundation or diminish it. Is our intervention likely to prolong or to shorten the war? Is it likely to increase the chance that peace, when it comes, will be a peace of oppression and injustice, breeder of future wars, or is it likely to make for the estab-

lishment of a stable international order in which we shall be left free to work out our peaceful mission without menace or aggression? Such may not be the grounds upon which our action may immediately rest, but they must be the grounds upon which the internationalist must rest his judgment of our action. If our intervention threatened to add calamity to the mountain of calamities now crushing the world, we ought not to abate our efforts to block it, however just our cause for war.

With one class of prophets it is possible to deal summarily. These are the chauvinistic Germans, whose fundamental premise is that, come what may, Germany will win the war and dictate her own terms of peace. In the eyes of these prophets the successive additions to the ranks of Germany's enemies, represented by England, Italy and Rumania, merely prolonged the war. By our export of munitions we have prolonged the war, and if we join the Allies we shall still further prolong it. If we reject the premise of Germany's inevitable victory, nothing is left of the argument. If Germany is to fail in her designs, the greater the combination of forces arrayed against her, the more promptly will she acknowledge that her designs have failed. And the readier she will be to offer terms that can be accepted without disaster to the existing international order.

Now, it appears to be the consensus of conservative opinion that a military conclusion cannot be reached on the western front within a period beyond which it is not humanly possible to prolong the war. The tensile strength of lines of trench defenses has been proved to be so great that it is out of the question that either side can force the other into the open and finish the war by a series of colossal battles. Either side may bring tremendous pressure against isolated points on the opposing line and force the surrender of ground. But so long as reserves hold out this method cannot produce conclusive results, and there is no prospect of the exhaustion of reserves, either German or Allied, in the near future. The intervention of the United States could have no immediate bearing upon this situation. It would insure the Allies against eventual exhaustion of reserves, however, and in so far would tend to break any determination on the part of the Germans to persevere to the end. The German reserves would fail first, a fact that German statesmen would have to take into account. But, even so, it is not to be expected that the Germans could eventually be wholly overthrown, their territory exposed to devastation, and forced to accept a peace involving the dismemberment of their empire. For a year at least they have reserves enough to hold the present line. They can greatly shorten their lines, while still on

foreign soil, and thus make slighter reserves answer the purposes of defense.

The Germans recognize that without us or with us, the Allies cannot be crushed on the western front. Their present hope of a conclusive victory reposes in the submarine. If they can starve England, they will win, and they would endure colossal sufferings and privations for one year, or two, or three, for the position of world hegemony that they would gain with England crushed, her fleet surrendered, her colonial empire shattered. The chances of success in the submarine campaign seem extremely promising to Germany, however exiguous they may seem to England. If we enter the war, prepared to apply our vast potential resources to the task of keeping navigation to England open, Germany can be convinced, at least in six months, that the submarine is a broken reed. She will recognize that her western projects have failed. Her hopes for the future will be thrown back upon the east.

And here we are confronted with a problem that deserves more serious consideration than we are accustomed to give it. How would American intervention affect the relations between Germany and Russia? Would not Germany feel forced to make terms with Russia and thus be enabled to throw all her resources against the Allied lines in France and Belgium? And suppose that this happened, would the Allied lines hold? The lines would still hold. The Germans are already employing on the western front all their best troops. They already have on this front all the men they can use.

If Germany has not already made a separate peace, it is not for want of the will to do it. It is for want of a price adequate to overcome Russian tenacity. What has Germany to give? Restore Poland without conditions and surrender Galicia, compensating Austria in Wallachia? That is not enough for a people that has set its heart on Constantinople. The offer of Armenia, Persia and British India? That might be enough, if it could be delivered. But delivery implies the breakdown of the British Empire, a condition still far from realization, and impossible of realization, if the resources of the United States are thrown into the scales. The abandonment of her ally, Turkey, to Russian mercies? Turkey would yet remain to be subjugated at a cost Russia is not ready to meet. Beyond this, it would be a counsel of desperation for Germany thus once for all to throw overboard all her Levantine ambitions and to consign her future to the conquest of the Atlantic, at the very time when the action of the United States rendered such conquest vastly more problematical than ever before.

Russia may make a separate peace with Germany, but if she does it will be through weariness of war and despair of the Allied cause, and in spite of, not because of, American association with that cause.

In so far as American influence will be felt at all, it will operate to rob the Germans of the belief that they are destined to emerge from the war as victors. It will increase their impatience with a war that demands continually more and greater sacrifices, with no sure advantages in prospect. Germany will the sooner be ready to treat for peace, not as last fall, in the rôle of magnanimous victor, but in the rôle of one afflicted nation among many, ready for genuine conciliation and substantial compromises. When this point has been reached it will be possible to discuss a peace in which the security of Germany as well as that of the other nations may be established not upon a basis of strategic points occupied and enemies weakened, but upon a basis of international organization.

But suppose that the Allies, confident of their power ultimately to wreak their will upon Germany, should flout any proposal of peace that did not involve the utter humiliation of Germany. If it was impossible for Germany to subjugate France in 1914, it will be still more impossible to subjugate Germany in 1917 or 1918. So far as the United States is concerned, it will not be a party to schemes of conquest and subjugation. Its influence cannot be employed to wage war beyond the time when an honorable peace can be established.

The Weak Spot in the American Position

IN another column there appears a very important letter entitled *The Law and the Facts of "Armed Neutrality."* It presents the views of a man who would be recognized at once as one of the highest American authorities on international law. The substance of his argument is that in arming ships which carry munitions to a belligerent the United States is making war upon Germany.

The State Department in its announcement to the world says that the armed guard will protect vessels and persons. No mention is made of cargo. This omission is undoubtedly due to a realization that the armed protection of munitions is a hostile act, and the orders as they stand are phrased so as to mean that technically the guns will not defend the cargo. In practice they will be compelled to defend it because under the rules by

which German submarines are now operating no visit and search appears feasible.

This legal tangle can be complicated ad infinitum. It arises in the first instance from our government's attempt to state a thoroughly differential policy in purely legal terms. It is pursuing a policy, not merely enforcing American rights, and at the same time it is refusing to describe the policy candidly and justify it, as it can be justified, on the grounds of vital national and international interest. It is stretching the word neutrality so much out of shape that it now covers naval warfare itself.

The real weakness of the American position today is not the course of action we have adopted but the nature of the policy on which that action is based. In choosing to share the burden of opening the highways to the western Allies our government is following the deepest need of American international interest. In defying the German terrorism it is serving the interest of a liberal society. In refusing to be cajoled into enforcing commercial rights in behalf of the aggressor on Belgium it is faithful to America's best aspiration. But in neglecting to avow this policy it is taking all the risks of war without any of the possible benefits. *C'est la guerre, mais ce n'est pas magnifique.* By obscuring the issue in legalism the administration is in the very great danger of making the conflict with Germany sterile and altogether meaningless.

As the thing now stands it is made to appear as if we were fighting a duel of honor, or worse still, fighting for the profits of our export trade. If that is all that is at stake it is not worth the bones of a single American sailor, and the contention of Mr. Bryan is fundamentally sound. In fact it would be criminal folly to extend the area of this world war if that is all that there is to our conflict with Germany. What is more, there can be no settlement of that conflict on purely legalistic grounds. If we fight merely to uphold a few of our rights on the sea, no peace can be made which will make those rights more secure than they were before the war. There is nothing Germany can give us if we defeat her which is more than a promise of about the same value as the Sussex pledge.

Unless America can emerge from the war as a member of a securer international order, unless a league for peace based on a stable settlement results, we shall have made the war of 1917 as inconsequential as the war of 1812. Unless America's hostility to Germany is the means to that end there can be no conclusion of any significance. It is only because our hostility can be interpreted and directed towards the stabilizing of the world that it is justifiable to liberal men. If there is no differ-

ence between the cause of Germany and that of the Western Allies, if it does not matter whether Germany dictates a peace against the West, if our insistence on carrying wheat and guns and mules to Britain is merely a capricious or a blind result of British sea power, on what grounds then can the awful risks of war be justified to the American people? And what will be our standing, what our purposes, at the coming peace congress, if we enter it as an armed neutral which has been waging a tacit war for a narrow portion of its rights?

Why should we take so bad a case, when we have such a good one? The President's address to the Senate is a sound expression, not of a "utopian dream" as superficial people imagine, but of vital American interest. Germany in this war has shown herself the enemy of that interest. The Allies have proclaimed themselves its friends, and have proved it partially at least by their deeds. That has been the true excuse for the differential neutrality which has now led to what is legally war. But unless it is openly said that American discrimination is to enforce peace against the aggressor, there remains a most perilous gap between action and policy.

Close that gap by avowing the truth, and there will be at the conference at least one powerful belligerent wholeheartedly, unreservedly committed to the organization of peace. There will be one great nation which can gain nothing by a new balance of power, one nation which can win only if the whole world is made more secure. This fact, we need hardly say, arises from no specific virtue in us but from the situation in which we find ourselves.

Pulling Congress Together

THE unexpectedly quick adoption of a rule by the Senate to prevent filibustering by a small minority illustrates one of the most baffling but one of the most fundamental characteristics of American political practice. Reforms which seem impossible one week become inevitable in the next. A group of intelligent reformers will work steadily but almost hopelessly for some improvement in political and social policy or methods and may be about to abandon the fight in despair when some accident calls public attention to the need of this particular reform, and a body of imperative opinion is created in its favor. In a jiffy the obdurate opposition disappears. Politicians insist upon voting for a change which a few weeks before would have been confronted with an impassable barrier of indifference or adverse conviction. So it has been with the change in the Senate rules.

The ability of a few senators to prevent any bill from coming to a vote and the inability of a large majority of the upper house to take the floor away from one of its loquacious members has long been an anachronism which called for remedial action, but its suppression involved the surrender by individual senators of a possibly profitable personal right, and they could find many reasons for refusing. But all these reasons vanished as soon as they were in danger of incurring serious unpopularity by continuing to refuse.

Specific abuses of American politics obtain their vitality from the indifference or ignorance of American public opinion. The politicians will always yield a particular point, such as the secret ballot or civil service examinations or direct primaries or the power of the Speaker to assign Congressmen to committees, because, assuming continued public indifference, they know full well their ability to assure their continued domination by the adoption of some other equally effective expedient. This is particularly the case with respect to the formidable array of abuses which have gradually accumulated in the organization and methods of Congress. Some phase of the existing bi-partisan system frequently becomes dangerously unpopular and is incontinently abandoned, but the system as a whole has not yet been shaken. The criticism which has for years been directed against it both by students of American government and in the newspapers and magazines has been almost wholly without practical result. Congress can and does ignore it with impunity. The last few years have witnessed an enormous increase in national expenditure, a rapid expansion of national administrative functions and a correspondingly increased necessity for an improved organization of financial and administrative methods. Yet Congress has done nothing to cut one item of Congressional graft or to release the administration of public business from a single source of disconcerting legislative interference. At the present writing it looks as if the bi-partisan Congressional machine would make the probability of war a pretext for preventing the few independents, who hold the balance of power in the House, from making use of that power to obtain even a very moderate program of rules reform. The leaders of the two parties are likely to gather together, nobly refuse to indulge in partisan squabbles during a national crisis and then settle down complacently and divide the spoils.

Public displeasure at the scandalous and humiliating exhibition which the last Congress made of itself was finally focused on the dramatic episode of filibuster. The result is that small minorities have been deprived of the power of preventing the passage of legislation; but, of

course, the more important causes of Congressional ineptitude have not been touched. Congress is an embarrassment rather than a source of strength to the country in a great national emergency, not because its members are incapable of useful public service, but because of the way in which the two houses are organized for the transaction of public business. They are organized into standing committees of which the most experienced members of the dominant party are the heads; and these committees are occupied almost entirely, not with discussing and deciding on matters of public policy, but in supervising the details of public expenditure and in securing jobs and appropriations for their associates and their districts. Thus the Senate and the House are both held together literally by "the cohesive power of public plunder." It is jobs and appropriations and pension bills about which the great majority of Congressmen are thinking and planning for the larger part of their time, and if their common interest in converting public business into sources of local and personal profit were taken away, the two houses would become more rather than less like helpless jelly-fish. What Congress needs is organized leadership which is responsible not to districts or states but to the nation, which will pull each of the two houses together for constructive legislation, and which possesses full power to initiate legislation and to secure its passage.

The leadership which Congress now possesses, apart from the bi-partisan organization for the distribution of plunder, is concentrated in the chiefs of the dominant party. But it has no authority except in relation to those matters of public policy which have been a matter of partisan controversy at the last election, and upon which the dominant party is united. In any event the President is being constantly driven to interfere with the leadership of his own party in Congress and to present "administration measures" which represent his ideas of what the public interest demands; and when these "administration measures" are presented Congress likes to take revenge by shooting them full of holes whenever, as is frequently the case, it can do so with impunity. The President is often obliged to submit without protest to the emasculation of his legislative program. He takes no formal and frank responsibility for it, and his power of whipping Congress into line depends largely upon the extent to which the President's party needs his assistance at the next election.

The remedy which has been generally suggested for these defects of leadership looks in the direction of doing away with the existing separation between the Executive and Congress. There are no constitutional obstacles to the presence of the

President or members of his Cabinet on the floor of both houses, where they could argue and plead on behalf of the administration measures. But this remedy has never made the slightest impression on Congress. Even if it had, it would not work without the organization of responsible support among Congressmen for the administration program. The need of such support has prompted Mr. Richard S. Childs to suggest a method of regularizing and supplementing the most effective aspect of the existing practice. The President must now, if only as a matter of tact, work in consultation with the more influential members of Congress. Why not regularize and strengthen this existing practice by holding in the President's room at the Capitol a weekly meeting of the President and certain natural leaders of the two houses? The leaders with whom he would consult would be selected by the President for their ability to work together and with him in preparing and passing legislative measures of the party. It is essential that they should be selected by him, irrespective in some measure of the ordinary committee chiefs of the house, because in no other way could the "conference" obtain the needed cohesion; and the method would not injure congressional independence, because in making his selections the President would be obliged to seek out members who possessed the confidence of their associates. It would constitute an agency for mediating between the two branches of the government, whose coöperation is essential to responsible and able conduct of the public business.

If the President's "conference" were adopted as a part of the unwritten constitution, it might soon develop into an unexpectedly useful institution. It would formulate the party legislative program. The President in making recommendations in his messages to Congress would embody its decisions. It would consider bills submitted by departmental and other experts and modify them so that a congressional majority could be mustered for them. Its members would explain and defend these measures on the floors of both houses, would reconsider, withdraw or amend after hearing the criticism, and finally would call for a vote with the revised measure as the majority party's official bill. If this plan obtained any success in practice, membership in the conference would be highly prized, because it would bring with it the authority which goes with inside knowledge and the prestige of presidential support and confidence. As a result of the increasing cohesion the morale of both houses would be improved. Assuming the existence of such responsible and consolidated leadership, rules reform could not long be delayed. Pork would cease to be the most effective way of holding

a majority together. The administrative services would be released from distracting congressional interference. Finally, the important bills of each session which constitute so large a part of the record of the President and his party would be handled in an orderly fashion and would be more rather than less subject to congressional control.

Such is Mr. Child's suggestion, and it is well worth careful consideration. The President would be almost certain to look upon it with favor because it is the development of a practice which he himself has done so much to advertise and promote. If the members of the two houses were capable of analyzing the strength and weakness of the strategic position of Congress in American government, they would appropriate the idea and seriously try to put it into practice. The House, for instance, would be wise to bestow control of the Committee on Rules upon those Congressmen who sat in the President's "conference," so that they could become officially responsible for the transaction of its business by the House of Representatives. The effect of the suggestion in practice would not be to subordinate Congress to the President but to subordinate the President to Congress. Our own misgivings about it concern this probable result. If the President and his Cabinet continued to be excluded from the deliberations of Congress and were represented on the floor only by members of the "conference" they might well have to pay an excessive price for organized congressional support. But these and other difficulties would be dealt with as they arose. For the present the one indispensable thing is to organize some kind of Congressional leadership which is not based on the "cohesive power of public plunder," which will be willing to coöperate with the President and which will deliberately seek to renew in Congress the ability to consider large matters of policy with a mixture of deliberation, decisiveness and self-possession.

China's Crisis

DURING our own international troubles we have lost sight of the fact that during the past thirty months the Far East has developed and that even now negotiations are under way for China's entrance into the European war which if successful may completely revolutionize the Asiatic world. The Entente Powers, presumably led by Japan, are endeavoring to bring about a declaration of war by China against Germany, in order to secure control of China's immense mining and munitions resources, her cheap labor and possibly her military establishment. In exchange they promise complete financial rejuvenation for China

through adjustments in the tariff and the payment of Boxer indemnities. The stakes are enormous and will affect profoundly the future of the Chinese people. How far the negotiations have gone as yet is uncertain. Some of the Entente representatives in this country have complete knowledge of the Entente's aims; from an authoritative source we know that the Allies have not begun to apply all possible pressure yet; Chinese diplomats here seem uninformed of the situation; and dispatches from China show France and Belgium already asking China to enter the war with the Entente. These facts indicate both that the negotiations have been initiated by the Allies but that they are still in such an immature state that China has not yet approached this country about them.

Undoubtedly China is hostile to Germany because of the latter's harsh diplomacy towards her. China remembers that the Kaiser ordered his Boxer expedition to drive a fear of Germany and the Germans into China that would outlive a hundred years, and that Germany wrenched from her the whole rich province of Shantung in recompense for the murder of two missionaries. Moreover, hundreds of Chinese coolies en route to Europe have been drowned on ships sunk by German submarines. Evidence is accumulating that Germany fears this dislike and is doing all in her power to forestall its consequences. For it is undoubted that China could be of very material injury to her at this time. China could be converted into an immense reservoir of munitions and men for the Entente. Her rich iron mines, now run at moderate pressure, could be speeded up to increase enormously the supply of that metal sent to Japan for the manufacture of munitions for Russia. Her five arsenals could be converted into appreciable supply bases for the eastern front. Her cheap labor could be mobilized on a war basis in a much more efficient way than now. The 100,000 men already sent to France and Russia as laborers by a Franco-British-Chinese syndicate could be greatly augmented if government direction were substituted for private. And after the war, the crippling of German trade in China offers serious possibilities.

But China faces grave dangers in this program. It is unquestioned that the Entente would postpone during the war the payment of the \$30,000,000 annual Boxer indemnity which has still twenty-three years to run and which is such a strain on China's depleted resources in actual money. There is grave doubt, however, whether the Entente would remit it entirely, as reported from Peking. The Entente would also probably agree to the plan long sponsored by the United States for an increase in China's import taxes from five per cent ad valorem to twelve per cent and a valuation more equitable

than the present, which is based on the values of twenty years ago. Such increases in revenue would go far towards solving China's financial troubles and solidifying the central government. Before entering the war on this basis, however, China must be sure, not only that she receives an adequate reward fully guaranteed, but that her future is guarded most carefully in a broader way. Undoubtedly the Allies would urge some sort of foreign control to make China's vast resources effective. This control ought to be purely advisory and wholly international. The opportunity for further encroachments by Japan should be prevented by a general international coöperation among the Entente Powers. Behind the preoccupations of the war Japan has conquered from Germany the whole Chinese province of Shantung, lengthened her lease of Port Arthur, Dalny, and the South Manchurian railroad to ninety-nine years, secured rights of residence, land-owning, police courts, mining, and financial preference in Manchuria, special rights in Fukien province off Formosa, restrictive powers in China's iron mines, and other rights. She has postponed but not abandoned her famous Group V demand for police, financial, and advisory powers, and her Cheng Chiatun demands for extension of Japanese power into inner, eastern Mongolia. China in seeking a big object should not compromise a bigger one still.

The Shipping Board's Opportunity

WHEN the law establishing a United States Shipping Board, with power to build, buy, charter or lease ships, and to operate, charter or lease ships constructed on its account was enacted, there was grave doubt among men familiar with the conditions of ocean transportation whether any practical good could come of it. In ordinary circumstances, was not competition quite as efficient a regulator of ocean freight rates as of any other prices? And assuming an absolute shortage of tonnage, entailing high freights, how could the Shipping Board remedy the situation? It might buy ships, but this would merely change the ownership of existing machinery of transportation, not increase them. It could build ships, but at such a time the shipyards are pretty certain to be congested with bottoms under construction on private account. Construction on the Shipping Board's account would represent merely a displacement of tonnage, not an increase. That these considerations bore weight is proved by the event. We are suffering under an unprecedented shortage of ocean tonnage. Charters are unavailable, or to

be had only at fabulous rates. What has the Shipping Board been able to do to relieve the situation? Nothing. Its \$50,000,000 appropriation is still intact. Yet the board consists of efficient and public-spirited men, eager to give a good account of the great trust reposed in them. They have been able to count upon the support of the President in any energetic action they might take. We may recall that the bill creating the board was put through under such pressure from the White House as would never have been applied if the President had not foreseen emergencies in which the power of the board might be required to meet a national emergency.

The emergency is upon us. Not only is our foreign trade choked by want of bottoms, but we are standing by, all but helpless, while Germany attempts to execute a design violative of our rights and incalculably dangerous to our national interests. Germany's hope of establishing a world power that would be a perennial menace to our security rests upon the possibility of sinking ships faster than England and the neutral nations can build them. And with the emergency has arrived the supreme opportunity of the Shipping Board. It is possible, immediately, for the Board to apply its power to the task of keeping ocean communications open, in spite of the submarines.

As we indicated in an earlier issue, it is possible, through the organization of our industrial resources, to make an immense addition to our ocean tonnage through the construction of motor-ships built of wood. Such ships can be made to answer whatever requirements of speed may be regarded as indispensable to the purpose. The motor-ship of this type carrying between three and four thousand tons and making nine knots, loaded, was a demonstrated commercial success even before the immense rise in freights consequent upon the war. A smaller, swifter ship would be commercially possible now, and would continue to earn profits long after the war, since years will be required to make good the world shortage in the larger steel ships. The smaller and swifter the ship, the better adapted it will be to meeting the conditions of submarine infested seas. And even after the restoration of normal shipping conditions we can find abundant opportunities to employ the smaller ships in improving inter-island communication in the Philippines and the West Indies, in the coastwise trade, and in developing regular communications with Latin-American ports not yet yielding freights sufficient to tempt the larger steel ships. As soon as the national purpose in providing adequate facilities for shipment to Europe shall be satisfactorily subserved by the reconstructed private shipping fleets, the government-owned motor ships can be

retired into trades which are not yet sufficiently developed to attract private enterprise. Thus the construction of a fleet of such motor ships would both meet the present national emergency and make provision for a healthy expansion of trade in the coming period of peace.

There are no unsolved technical problems in the way of the adoption of such a plan by the Federal Shipping Board. The ships can be built and provided with efficient motors in a time incredibly brief, as ship construction goes. In six months we could be turning out ships ready for chartering; possibly in five months. There is no financial problem to be solved. The Shipping Board, with its \$50,000,000 and its power to invite the participation of private capital, could add a million and a half to our ocean tonnage. There will be no difficulty in making arrangements with constructors. They recognize the emergency and will give their services on a peace-profits basis. The one obstacle that the plan might encounter is the traditional dilatoriness of governmental action. The emergency is at hand, and to delay weeks and months might well defeat the project altogether.

Fortunately, the Shipping Board consists not of bureaucrats or politicians, but of business men. Already the press reports encouraging indications of prompt and energetic action by the Board in this direction. They will recognize that we can not wait indefinitely for naval architects to work out the best conceivable type of ship. There are at hand types known to be practicable and the immediate need is to begin building them. With the work of building under way, innumerable improvements will suggest themselves. We shall arrive at the perfect type, or rather types, under the stress of action. We shall arrive at nothing through delay.

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Peace by Organization

[NOTE: This article is the concluding chapter of a book by Mr. Brailsford entitled *A League of Nations*, already published in England, and to appear shortly in this country. It was written before the break between Germany and the United States.—THE EDITORS.]

THROUGH its wandering course this book has pursued a single idea. The meaning of the war was changed from the moment that the conception of a League of Nations became, through the prophetic declarations of Mr. Asquith, the eloquent hints of M. Briand, the reasoned support of Lord Grey, the determined advocacy of President Wilson and the support of the German Chancellor, the program of statesmen who have power to realize it. Defeat means our failure to achieve international organization, and victory means our success. It is impossible any longer to measure our accomplishment by any scattered tests. We may acquire colonies, impose indemnities, conquer regions of Turkey, and effect territorial changes in Europe, but if we fail to create the organization of an enduring peace we have failed in the only aim which could compensate the world for these years of heroism and misery, of endurance and slaughter. The settlement of the war and the creation of the League are not two separate problems. They are a single organic problem. The League cannot be based on a settlement which merely registers the claims of successful force. The settlement must be the preparation for the League, and its guiding principle must be to make the changes, and only those changes, which are indispensable for an enduring peace. If we despair of a League of Nations, then perhaps no other choice might be open to us but to follow the weary precedent of other wars, to weaken the enemy and to strengthen ourselves, to isolate him and to consolidate our own faction in the world. From that logic follow "wars after peace," trade boycotts, armaments, and permanent conscriptions. If, on the other hand, we have reason to believe that the solid structure of a League of Nations can be created, we must find in it a place, not for ourselves only but for the enemy also. We must face the thought that he, too, will be a partner in a coöperative task. The world which creates a League of Nations must be a world in which all may labor freely and fruitfully, cherishing neither the hope of revenge nor a grievance which will prompt them to break peace. Without the promised coöperation of America we might well have despaired of making this League in our own generation. Her aid is indispensable; but if we

know that we must come to her to countersign our bonds and guarantee the enemy's observance of the treaty, it follows that the settlement must make a world which has in her view the elements of permanence, order, and goodwill. She will not guarantee a peace which is based on exclusions and boycotts, on conquests and punishments. Her offer is to ensure the idea of international right.

We have to choose between two conceptions of security. One is a world in which victorious force, always prepared, always united, imposes its will on an enemy whose numbers and talents and spirit cannot be destroyed, a world which would pass from exhaustion to a renewal of strife, and from strife to war. The other is a world which has used the shock and disturbance of war to purge itself of its worst mischiefs, and on that foundation of contentment has built a society of coöperative work and international conference. This better world is within our reach. Our own statesmen desire it. America will help us to create it. The enemy himself through his chief spokesman has declared his assent. We set out to destroy Prussian militarism. It will be destroyed at the moment when a German government pledges itself to enter a League based on arbitration and conciliation. Short of that we may slaughter Prussians but we cannot destroy militarism.

In the remaining pages I propose to sum up and set together in a balanced whole the various suggestions scattered throughout the book for a settlement designed to prepare a League of Nations. Two preliminaries must be assumed. The first is that the enemy will agree to restore without reserves the independence of Belgium and to indemnify her for the wrong done to her, to render back to France (if he still holds them) the occupied Departments, and to restore the Kingdom of Serbia. In these preliminaries the positive designs of his militarism are overthrown, for he will have given up the military road to Calais and the military road to Bagdad. The second is that he has agreed in principle to enter a League of Nations, and has thereby with his own hands (no others can do it) destroyed the moral spirit of his militarism. After these preliminaries the Powers may proceed to a negotiated peace. Nothing else is for us a vital question of honor, and the extent of the concessions which we may secure will depend on the extent of the concessions which we are prepared to make. The formula which would best answer the real needs of both sides would be: concessions from the Central Powers to the idea

of nationality in Europe; concessions from the Allies to the idea of commercial freedom and colonial opportunity beyond Europe. The war settlement (which is likely to come only through American mediation) must come first, and in it the ideas of a League of Peace, of commercial freedom, of the reduction of armaments, and of the reform of the law of war at sea would be defined only in outline. To work out these conceptions would be the task of further congresses over which America would naturally preside. The order of these congresses might be so arranged that our final assent to a charter of commercial freedom might be delayed until the enemy on his side had ratified a satisfactory constitution for the League of Nations, and assented to a reasonable plan for the reduction of armaments. With the reminder that nationality may be secured, not merely by partitions and annexations but by the concession of autonomy, let us proceed to trace this settlement in broad outlines. If the form of the sketch seems dogmatic, that is only because to say at each sentence "I venture to suggest" or "perhaps we might consider" would consume space and time.

I. THE WAR SETTLEMENT.

1. *General*.—The signatory Powers agree to meet in congress after the conclusion of this treaty, to evolve permanent plans for the future organization of international relations. They will draw up (a) a plan for the prevention of wars by enforced recourse to arbitration or conciliation; (b) a plan for the general reduction of armaments; (c) a scheme for the reform of the laws of war on land and sea; and (d) a general charter of commercial freedom. Ratification shall follow only when all these agreements are completed.

In the interval the communications between the belligerents shall be resumed provisionally on the basis of the commercial treaties in force before the outbreak of this war.

2. *Restorations*.—Germany will recognize the independence, integrity, and neutrality of Belgium, and pay to her an indemnity to be fixed by a neutral commission nominated by the President of the United States.

The belligerents will on the conclusion of this treaty evacuate the occupied territory held by them, save as provided in Article 3.

3. *Nationality*.—The recognition of the rights of nationality in Europe shall be insured by the following territorial and political changes. Commissions shall be nominated under neutral presidency to delimit frontiers, to conduct plébiscites in cases where either party contends that the wishes of the population are in doubt, and to arrange for the migration, by those who desire it, with the minimum of hardship.

(a) The French-speaking districts of German Lorraine shall be ceded to France [and the status of Alsace determined by a plébiscite]. France will permit the free export of iron ore from Lorraine to Germany.

(b) The Italian-speaking districts of the *Trentino* shall be ceded to Italy.

(c) *Poland* shall be constituted an independent state. A convention directly elected by universal suffrage shall determine its constitution and elect its sovereign (if it decides for a monarchy). The Polish state consists of the Duchy of Warsaw [the western region of Galicia and a certain region of Posen].

(d) The *Ruthenian* districts of Galicia and *Bukovina* shall be ceded to Russia and the Rumanian district of the *Bukovina* to Rumania, if the inhabitants so determine by plébiscite.

(e) *Austria-Hungary* undertakes that it will forthwith so remodel its constitution as to insure full autonomy to all the component nationalities of both monarchies.

(f) To the restored kingdoms of *Serbia* and *Montenegro* [united in a federal or personal union] shall be ceded such adjacent portions of Austrian territory as are required to give them ample and convenient access to the Dalmatian coast.

(g) *Serbia* shall in return restore to *Bulgaria* the "uncontested zone" of *Macedonia* as fixed by the treaty of 1912.

(h) *Albania* is restored within its former limits, and placed for a period of twenty years under the protectorate of Italy.

(i) *Cyprus* shall be ceded to Greece.

(j) The six *Armenian vilayets* are ceded to Russia, which undertakes to confer autonomy upon them.

(k) *Kiao-Chau* is restored to China.

4. The *Straits* of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles shall be open in peace and war to the navigation of Russian vessels whether naval or commercial. They shall be neutralized, with their shores disarmed, and placed under the guardianship of an international commission.

5. The Powers recognize the priority of German claims to the development of industrial enterprises requiring concessions in Asiatic Turkey excepting Syria. Neither by customs nor by railway or harbor rates shall Turkey discriminate or allow discrimination against any signatory Power. The priority of French interests is similarly recognized in Syria. [Palestine shall be created an autonomous province with a Jewish administration under an international guarantee.]

6. East Africa is restored to Germany. The Allies, if they elect to retain the other occupied German colonies, shall, among themselves, whether by purchase or exchange, arrange to cede a convenient and accessible zone of equatorial Africa to Germany, equivalent in value and extent to her annexed colonies. [The further extension of this zone may be provided for by understandings conferring on Germany the right of preëmption over certain adjoining regions under French, Belgian, or Portuguese rule, or by the exchange of the French Congo, in part or whole, against Alsace-Lorraine.]

The passages within square brackets in the above outline include questionable items, some of which are not within the scope of a negotiated settlement as the military balance now stands. Details manifestly depend on the course and duration of the war. It is difficult to secure an exact balance of gain and loss between allies on either side. This might be achieved within each group by a division of the financial costs of the war. It should be noted that though Serbia

and Rumania will not on the balance gain territory, Serbia achieves her ambition of an outlet to the Adriatic, and both states secure the liberation of their kinsmen in Austria-Hungary by the gift of autonomy. Russia surrenders Poland, but only to Poles. She secures her ambition on the Straits, and has in Armenia territory to balance the loss of Poland.

II. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The constitution and principles of the League of Nations shall be determined by a congress which shall sit [within one year from the conclusion of peace]. At this congress, in addition to the late belligerents, the United States of America shall be represented, and to it such other civilized sovereign states as the American President shall name, shall be invited. The following sketch conveys suggestions for the constitution of the League:

1. *The Prevention of War.*

The signatory states agree to refer all disputes incapable of adjustment by diplomacy—(a) if justiciable, to a court of arbitral justice; (b) if non-justiciable, to a standing council of inquiry and conciliation, to which their governments will nominate representatives for a term of years. They undertake neither to make wars nor to mobilize against each other until the court or council has, within a stipulated time, issued its award or recommendation, nor for a stipulated time thereafter.

The executive of the League [representing the governments of the great Powers] shall, in case of a threatened breach of this fundamental obligation, concert effective measures, military or economic, to insure its observance. The signatory states will support this common action, subject to the several undertakings into which each of them may enter on their adherence to the League.

The executive will concert measures for mutual defense when a signatory state is attacked by any state which refuses to submit its case to the appropriate tribunal or council.

Should any state fail to accept and give effect to the recommendations of the council of conciliation or the award of the tribunal, the executive will forthwith determine what collective action, if any, is required to meet this situation.

The executive, subject to safeguards to be agreed upon, shall determine the right of any state to be admitted to the League, and may expel, subject to safeguards and the right of appeal, any state which has violated its constitution. The right of secession is recognized.

No treaty of alliance, past or future, shall bind any state adhering to the League to support an ally who had engaged in war without submitting his case to a court or council of the League, or has become involved in war by reason of his failure to accept or give effect to the award or recommendation of a court or council of the League.

2. *Nationality.*

The signatory Powers will define in a declaration, to be embodied in the constitution of the League, their resolve to accord to all racial minorities in their European territories full liberty for the use of their language, the development of their culture, and the exercise of their religion.

3. *Reduction of Armaments.*

The Powers will consider measures for a general reduction of armaments on land and sea. [This might provide (a) for the limitation of the term of service in national armies, say to six months in the infantry; (b) for the suspense of all building of capital ships for a term of years until a permanent agreement could be reached as to ratios of building.]

4. *The Law of War at Sea.*

This may be remodelled on the principle that embargoes on commerce, blockades, and the capture of enemy merchant vessels are permitted only in public wars sanctioned or declared by the executive of the League. In private, unauthorized wars the strictest definition of neutral rights as maintained by the American school will be enforced.

5. *Humanity in Warfare.*

The convention regulating warfare shall be revised, particularly as regards aircraft, submarines, floating mines, the use of gas, and the exception of food destined for a civilian population from the rigors of a blockade.

6. *A Charter of Commercial Freedom.*

(a) The signatory Powers shall accord to each other in their home markets "most favored nation" treatment; (b) in their non-self-governing colonies they will impose tariffs (if any) for revenue purposes only; (c) they will concert measures to secure "the Open Door" to all foreign enterprise in undeveloped regions, particularly in China; (d) they will appoint as an organ of the League an international commission to insure free access for the trade of all the signatory Powers to raw materials and other natural resources.

A writer who attempts amid the noise and passion of war to frame some sketch of the better organization which we hope to build on the sacrifices and heroism of those who have fallen works in the dark and questions the unknown. It may be that agreements concluded in secrecy commit the peoples of Europe to protracted warfare for very different ends. It may be that the passions which strife has kindled have obscured in the minds of statesmen the aims which still survive in the hearts of the volunteers who took up arms to make an end of wars. That early impulse of idealism still lives, but it struggles with the resentments, the fears, and the appetites which have grown up in three years of bitterness and disillusion. It is easier to believe in victory than to cherish faith in the organization of peace. The danger is not that we shall deliberately reject the program of a League of Nations: it is that we shall postpone it. Because the noise of strife has distracted our efforts to think of it at leisure we are tempted to thrust it into the remoter future. To postpone it may be in effect to reject it. Unless we know ourselves what we intend by it, unless our plans, through neutral channels, are known to our enemies, unless America, encouraged by both sides, will push her advocacy of the scheme, we shall reach the settlement undecided and unprepared.

Without the firm resolve to make the League itself an article, and the first article, in the settlement our need of security will drive us inevitably to other expedients. The settlement, unless the idea of the League penetrates it and inspires it, must draw its principle from the older statecraft of anarchy and force. It will not make the Europe that could enter into a League. The hope may still haunt us, but the moment of creation will have passed. Each side will turn away, sullen and alienated, from the congress which will have ended the war only to make an armed peace. We shall return to our normal lives only to resume the old precautions. Naval programs must be drafted. Alliances must be renewed. Conscription must become a permanency. Treaties of commerce must be negotiated, and if they cannot be based on the idea of coöperative work and commercial freedom, they will announce the "war after peace." Amid recriminations and retaliations, our movement will not be towards a League of Nations. There are those who contemplate five years of a penal and hostile peace, a time for boycotts and punishments, a time for the passing of resentments which the slaughter and pain of the battlefield has not sated. In five years, they say, the world will be purged of its crimes and its hatreds, and we may turn with relief to the organization of peace. Men's passions will not keep these time tables. The blows we dealt would be answered. Boycott would reply to boycott, and wherever the enemies met in the wide world it would be as foes who would add new counts with each embittered year to the indictments of the past. The five penal years would bring no healing, and at their end we should be farther from the League of Nations than we are on the battlefields of to-day. The hope of the world is in our grasp. At the settlement of this war we may realize it. If that moment escapes us, we and our children may expiate our cowardice and our indecision in an epoch which will turn to revolution as a mild alternative to war.

We are nearer to our goal than we know. In both camps men have fought for it, died for it, and slain each other to realize it. The enduring peace is the hope which has sustained the enemy's soldiers no less than our own. The will to realize it is more massive and more general than the will for strife. The future of Europe is irredeemably dark only to the pessimist who has seen in this war nothing but the working of forces of destruction. Violent and egoistic as the impulses were which ranged the nations in antagonisms that could issue only in war, these impulses were in themselves a proof of vitality. They have driven countless legions to death, they have squandered

the productive forces of hand and brain, and poisoned civilization itself. It is possible, none the less, to look on all this ruin and yet to hope. It sprang from many passionate resolves to extort change from destiny. It was an act of insurgence against the death in life which acquiesces in hampered conditions and unsolved problems. There was in this concerted rush to ruin and death the force of a rebellious and unconquerable life. It was bent on change, for it knew that the real denial and surrender of life is not physical death but the refusal to move and progress. The evil in Europe was not so much the statement of these positive demands for change, reckless and self-regarding as some of them were. It was rather the inertia, the impotence, the suspicion, the lack of social sense which stood in the way of these necessary changes. The way of hope is not in the retrospective moralizings which distribute blame and to blame would add punishment. The way of hope is to accept these impulses which uttered a genuine tendency of living men, to find for them by adjustment and compromise the satisfactions which are possible in the settlement, and to prepare in the future organization of the nations the promise and possibility of regulated and ordered change. Let us defeat anything rather than a genuine impulse of life. The settlement will be fragile and temporary if it leaves any nation thwarted and frustrated. Some ambitions must be content with partial satisfaction. Some must be realized with less than that dramatic completeness which flatters the vanity of one people, while it condemns the other to the bitterness of revenge. For all the warring nations we must make the conditions of present life and future growth. On a peace which aims at general contentment we may build the League of Nations. From penalties and retaliations it will not come: these are the means by which an ill past perpetuates itself. It will come when each nation turns to its fellow and speaks, though it be still in bewilderment and pain, the wish to create the coöperative world in which all may live and grow.

H. N. BRAILSFORD.

London.

Despair of the State

AT a first reading the importance of Mr. Jacks's article entitled *The Root of Insanity*, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for January, was not obvious; it seemed interesting merely because of the personal revelation of the effects of the war on a facile and brilliant temperament. The writer has been for months using the *Hibbert Journal*, which he edits, to make the best of the war; to

extol the patriotic virtues which it has called out, and the self-sacrifice and courage shown by those who are taking part in it. Suddenly, it would appear, a young soldier, just back from the trenches, told him and his friends that they were talking nonsense, and from that moment his general scheme of things collapsed like a pricked bubble. The result was a wail of despair to the effect that human nature is all right (a view which Mr. Jacks had been disputing in some of his earlier writings) but that what he called "state nature" is all wrong. The obvious comment on this is that neither human nature nor "state nature" is either all right or all wrong. Good and evil are mixed in them, and progress means the production of a more satisfactory proportion between the two.

A second reading shows that the article is a most valuable though disquieting symptom of a state of mind which seems to be growing more frequent in Europe the longer the war lasts, and is all the more disquieting because it contains an element of real truth. Men are beginning to do that which the old Roman general refused to do: they "despair of the state." It is therefore, worth asking why this attitude is growing, apart of course from the nerve-shattering effects of the war, which will in time pass away.

It seems to be a reversed recognition of the fact which was expressed by Edith Cavell when she said, "Standing in the presence of eternity I begin to see that patriotism is not enough." Mr. Jacks and his friends in England, just like his enemies in Germany, have, in practice if not in theory, deluded themselves into thinking that patriotism is enough, and now when the blood of their children rises up to warn them that they are wrong they have begun to read the lesson backward as though it had said, "Patriotism is too much."

It is curious, though not unintelligible, that this kind of mistake is in the main being made by the philosophers of the present day rather than by historians. It is not unintelligible; for the great fault of the philosophers of the present generation has been that they have neglected history, or, still worse, have rewritten history to suit their own theories. This may be seen even in Mr. Jacks, who is by no means one of the greatest sinners in this respect. In his magazine he has always boasted that he has no place in it for a treatment of dead religions. And indeed in the *Hibbert Journal* any treatment of history has been scanty and usually imperfect. Yet if he had listened to the message of history he would not have been so ready now to despair of the state. He would have been anxious for its intelligent development rather than for the abandonment of all progress

in that mildly ethical anarchism which seems to be his latest panacea.

Since the days of the Reformation men in northern Europe have resolutely attempted to develop society on the basis of nationalism. That has been the chief contribution of Protestant political philosophy as opposed to that of Catholicism. It has resulted in a congeries of states owing no duties to each other, but reverting in religion to the cult of a tribal god, and in ethics to that peculiar morality which condones, when taken collectively against citizens of other nations, actions which would be regarded with horror if committed individually against members of the same community. That Germany has been the greatest sinner in this respect does not absolve other nations, who have been saved from an equal degree of guilt, partly by a saving lack of logic, partly by inefficient preparation. The whole European world has been based on the theory, explicit or implicit, that nationalism or patriotism is "the last word." To suggest any other view has been to incur the ridicule of politicians and the contempt of "practical men." The tragedy produced by this illusion is sufficient to explain Mr. Jacks's despair; but the historian takes comfort in the remembrance that in the days of Rome, whether imperial Rome or Holy Rome, the world knew a better "last word." In those days men understood that the true goal of effort was not the supremacy of one nation over another but their loyalty and subservience to the Empire—the common "superior of nations." It is true that Rome failed; but that was not because the ideal was wrong, or even impossible, but because it was prostituted to lower purposes by German Princes and Italian Prelates.

At the present moment those who have eyes to see must realize that this kind of nationalism is going down to its grave in a welter of patriotic bloodshed, and "Patriotism is not enough." What the world needs is that the courage and intelligence which have been given to patriotism should in future be devoted to a higher aim, which shall transcend, not destroy, the claims of nationalism.

Mr. Jacks is perfectly right in his belated recognition of the disastrous results of a state which is merely national, but the true lesson is that we should move on to achieve something better, and therefore necessarily more complex. History and biology conspire to assure us that progress is always in the direction of increased complexity and multifariousness, and the new world which will come after the war, if only men do not despair, will be far richer in variety than the old.

The problem of the future is twofold. In the

first place we need an organization which will do justice to the largeness, transcending political and racial boundaries, of economic and intellectual interests. Whatever may be the political map of Europe the economist knows that, unless civilization is to go rapidly backward, it must be divided into a very small number of economic units, and that economic life cannot be confined by the limits of existing national boundaries. The scholar knows equally well that although intellectual work may be, and to some extent necessarily is, colored by the nationality of the scholar, his value depends largely on his power to control this national element in his work. More and more scholarship becomes world-wide and cannot be fettered to national distinctions.

In the second place we need an organization which will do justice to the smallness of national units, and will preserve to each of the many small nations of Europe the privilege of arranging their customs and conventional laws (which are, after all, the things which make up what men term liberty) in their own way and not in accordance either with the ways of other people or with a colorless scheme based on a compromise between all the members of an economic unit. If such an organization can be reached there is no reason whatever to doubt that the existence of all that

is good and desirable in nationalism will not merely be preserved, but even be more highly developed. Nationalism would not disappear because economic interests were subsumed under a higher unity any more than family life disappeared when man first accepted the subordination of the family to the tribe.

Instead of despairing of the state, as Mr. Jacks appears to do, it would be far better if he and his friends would make a serious effort so to arrange the progress of events that when the peace convention be ultimately called together, wherever and whenever that may be, it shall be not merely with the intention of drawing up a more or less illusory treaty of peace, and then disappearing, but with the far more difficult though far more useful purpose of remaining as the permanent standing committee on European affairs. Whether Europeans like it or not they are obliged to live together; and whether they are going to live together for the advantage or the disadvantage of the rest of the world, depends upon the existence of some controlling body which without interfering with the expression of national taste and character shall have a regulative voice in those economic matters which increasingly transcend the narrow limits of national life.

K. POOL.

Indiana's Double Somersault

INDIANA'S recent double somersault into both the suffrage and prohibition columns has unique and interesting phases that distinguish it from the acrobatic haste of other states to join the ranks of commonwealths where women vote and nobody drinks. Contrary to the usual precedent, the same legislature has bestowed the franchise on women and put the ban on alcohol, and it has enacted the two measures into law within the space of two weeks. By this token it is evident that prohibition has been written into the statutes of Indiana by the will of men alone, a consummation which in the North at least has usually followed several years in the wake of votes for women and often directly because of votes of women. Then, in permitting women to vote for delegates to the impending constitutional convention and for the ratification of the new constitution with its prospective grant of full constitutional voting privileges, Indiana for the first time in history is giving women a share in the decision whether they shall have the ballot. Finally, it is most important to note that Indiana's action is the logical and apparently inevitable result of local conditions and not

to any extent a related unit in the great wave of social legislation that is sweeping the nation.

"It won't be long," said Stephen Leacock recently to a Hoosier audience, "until in the entire United States you will have women with a vote and men without a drink, and I don't for the life of me know what the women will do with their new possession and what the men will do without their old one." However accurately Mr. Leacock may have diagnosed the future, neither he nor anyone else can with truth throw Indiana indiscriminately in with the other states. True to her century-old tradition of isolation and independence of action, a characteristic which has given the state strangely contradictory aspects of radicalism and conservatism, Indiana has arrived at prohibition and woman suffrage all by herself, without the instigation or encouragement of outsiders, and simply as the logical goal of conditions in the commonwealth which could not have worked out otherwise.

This indigenous and self-developing nature of the situation is the most plausible explanation of the complete surprise with which not only the

nation at large but many in the state received the news, and at the same time it is an explanation of the matter-of-fact, thoroughly expectant manner in which the major part of the state watched the proceedings to the end. Except in its cities, Indiana has probably been less affected by the succeeding tides of immigration than any state in the Middle West. More than any, it has retained unmixed its early New England blood, and in isolation it has preserved most of the traits of that blood-dogged self-reliance, ingenuity in meeting difficult situations without the help of others, suspicion of outsiders and all their ways, patience and toleration of irksome conditions until with sudden grim determination those conditions are swept away. As a result, there were few in Indianapolis who had any idea the present legislature would do more than dally with social legislation as it had in the past, playing horse with the supporters of such legislation and jockeying for an opportunity to silence them effectively and turn to other matters. When the lower house passed the prohibition measure, the incredulous charged that action to shrewd politics, thinking that the Republicans dominant in that body were merely passing on the responsibility to the senate where, with the parties evenly divided, it would be easy enough to manoeuvre a lingering death. In the interval that elapsed before the final vote, though, it became apparent that the state at large was determined to see it through. Even reactionary holdovers from a former election felt the pressure exerted from home, and the liquor interests suddenly realized that the election last fall had something more than national partisan significance, for although the Republicans, twice shy from former experiences, had been silent as the moon in regard to the saloon in their platform and the Democrats had pledged their faith in existing laws, still in many cases it turned out that the legislators were pledged "dry" to their constituents. It was too late, though, to start a counteractive campaign, and the vote which clinched the prohibitory statute ignored party lines and spoke with the decisive voice of 38 to 11. With alcohol outlawed, the back of the traditional brewery opposition to woman suffrage was broken, and it was only a matter of a few days, characterized by a sullen, dilatory deliberateness, until both houses concurred in a suffrage statute.

Not only the character of the legislation, unexpected in the cities and taken for granted in the country and smaller towns, but the more superficial features of the situation point to the fact that Indiana turned her double somersault without consulting anyone else. Contrary to the prohibition and suffrage campaigns in other states, there

was no widespread flood of oratory, no carefully laid newspaper propaganda, no importation of speakers and workers of national prominence and experience. The state simply made up its mind what it wished and it compelled its representatives to stand and deliver. The legislature itself can take little credit for its action, for its record in matters of economy, taxation and other social legislation on which it had received no direct orders from the people is the old story of petty party politics.

Indiana's banishment of the saloon might have been forecast by anyone who believes that a community can finally be aroused to action by the persistence of a brazen abuse. Brewery politics had so long held the entire state in its grip—from the smallest town up through the state offices and the legislature—that self-respecting citizens were ready to forego personal privileges to win back again their civic rights. The police had been corrupted, the courts had been tampered with, elections had been bought and sold until the federal government stepped in and sent a hundred saloon politicians from Terre Haute to Leavenworth prison. I can remember how in the small town where I lived as a boy a handful of saloon keepers dictated who should be mayor and councilmen and even school commissioners. Your Hoosier is born a politician, and your Hoosier saloon keeper came into the world with a university education in the craft! The revolt against him has been civic and social rather than moral and religious, and the result, therefore, is likely to be more permanent than if it had come on the crest of some transient emotional wave.

The protest against saloon domination of politics did not come to a head over night. For years Indiana has had a model remonstrance law. And eight years ago on the eve of his retirement from office, Governor Hanley called the legislature in special session to enact a county local option law. Just as prohibition could not prohibit until the Webb-Kenyon law was held constitutional, so was county option ineffective when you could board an interurban and nullify the law by a quick trip to the next county seat. As much because of the practical failure of the law as because the opposition party soon came into power, the law was repealed and the old order returned more defiantly than ever, only to defeat its own purpose and strangle its own life.

The significance of the contemporaneous grant of suffrage to women and the authorization of a constitutional convention is hard to overrate. Powerless to prevent the adoption of the suffrage law, its enemies tried to emasculate it by denying women the right to vote for delegates to the con-

stitutional convention which had been called by an earlier act of the legislature. The present wording of the constitution limits the possible scope of woman suffrage to bounds somewhat more ample than in Illinois. Just as in that state, Indiana women may now vote for presidential electors and for all state and local officers and judges not mentioned in the constitution, but in Indiana there are fewer such officers named in the fundamental law of the state. Full suffrage powers, therefore, are dependent on the action of the constitutional convention and must wait the adoption of the instrument it devises. The final victory was won by the women when the bill became law with the provision for their voting not only for delegates to the constitutional convention but also for the adoption of the instrument itself, thus giving women a full voice in enfranchising themselves for the first time in history.

As in the case of prohibition, the enactment of the woman suffrage law was just the last chapter in a struggle extending far back in the state's history—a struggle just as local and individualized as that over the liquor question. Thanks to the efforts of Robert Dale Owen and a few other broad-minded members of the constitutional convention of 1851, the instrument devised by that body gave women fuller rights and privileges than in any other state at that time. Local organizations and conventions kept interest in the question alive and developed such personalities as May Wright Sewall, Zerelda G. Wallace, Helen M. Gougar and Ida Husted Harper, whose influence reached out far beyond the confines of their own state, and Mrs. S. C. Stimson, the guiding mind of the present suffrage campaign. Numerous sessions of the legislature have wrestled with the question, sidestepping the issue each time at a crucial moment, notably that of the year 1899 when, with both branches favorable to passage, the act was nullified by a technicality. The victory of partial suffrage this year, with full suffrage in the offing, came as a result of the discovery that the constitutions of Indiana and Illinois were similar and the entering wedge might be applied in the same way.

The passage of both the prohibition and the suffrage measures at the same time may be somewhat disconcerting to those who have supported one of them exclusively and opposed the other, for there will be no opportunity to observe the influence of either one alone upon the social and civic life of the state. The results can not be differentiated, although the woman vote will be tabulated separately from that of the men. That there will be results, however, is a reasonable expectation. The eradication of ulterior motives and in-

fluences from the political life of the state should be an advantage in itself and should lead to widespread constructive social thought and effort. Indiana is already among the leading communities of the nation in prison laws and administration, with a model penal farm, a long and honorable record on the indeterminate sentence, and an avowed application of reformation instead of punishment—even to the name of the institution—in cases where the prisoner is under the age of thirty. Such relics of a passing theory of government as the state's taxation system and opposition to mothers' pensions and home rule for cities may now be subject to a searching and unhampered revision.

OLIVER M. SAYLER.

Composition and Theory

HAVING taught English composition now for eighteen years, I calculate that I have perused the manuscripts of more than two thousand different students, read and corrected in detail more than sixty thousand papers short and long, revised or passed over the grammar of more than two million sentences, and inspected the choice of more than thirty million words—among which *athletics* has appeared, it is probable, at least one hundred thousand times. Lay the sheets of these manuscripts end to end and they would extend from New York to Princeton, unless Princeton should protect herself; place them in a square and they would cover Central Park; set them all ablaze at once, and the fire department would turn in a general alarm; but response to it would be a mistake. Of course there must be women who, in the same length of time, have washed as many dishes as I have read themes, and the intellectual and physical labor involved is surely much the same, so that I hope no one will suppose me boastful; but it would on the other hand be strange if from this multitude of nettles I had plucked never a rose of philosophy and it is the sweetness and beauty of such a flower or two that I wish to offer for inspection now.

Perhaps the most striking fact in all these years of composition has been the docility of the students. Is "the arrogance of youth" a meaningless phrase? I can count upon my fingers the students who have rebelled against my criticism. Grammar and spelling of course are right or wrong, like arithmetical solutions; but what of organization? There are ways and ways of arrangement—why should the undergraduate accept my way in preference to his own? Granted, of course, freely granted, that my way is better, a point I should be the last to dispute; is not his way *his*, and does not

the sun seeks her own path to light? What about "awkwardness?" Rhythm and melody are matters of taste, and yet, though I have set upon the margin of themes an entanglement of K's (K is my symbol for awkwardness) that would barricade trenches from Switzerland to the North Sea, few are the bold spirits who have burst through anywhere. As for the choice of words, it should be like the choice of sweethearts, governed by no rational consideration; but I have dictated marriages of thought and phrase like a sultan, without provoking a whimper of opposition. If this submissiveness were bred of apathy I could comprehend it, but it is not. Long ago at our institution composition was accepted as of "practical value"; the very fullbacks will grant its worth, and labor to succeed in it; and for the elective courses, are there not always three applicants to one who finds a place? Of course complaints concerning grades are always with us, but they are not to the point. Once a black-eyed little lady—I wish I could remember her name—remarked to me after some comment of mine, "Oh, if I were only a man, I tell you I would say D——!" But that was a question of grade-points; she was proceeding on the theory that one good D deserves another. But I am speaking of a painful humility regarding *form*. I think it must be due—I say this reluctantly—to ignorance. I think not one student in fifty has written enough to know whether he is saying what he means or not. I wonder whether the same conditions prevail at Harvard or at Bryn Mawr? I wonder whether they prevail with us, in philosophy and economics? I know they do not in athletics. Of course a coach is an absolute dictator but he prevails *vi et armis*. So can not I. I heard a coach say once, "Smith, I would call you a jackass, only jackasses are useful." I saw another—this was years ago, it's true—follow behind a man the length of a football field, kicking him where opportunity offered, to impress upon him the vital necessity of keeping his face to the foe. I could not do these things. My heart is not hard enough, nor my leg sufficiently agile. And besides, I should be arrested, and no one would go on my bond. Yet I have heard a hurdler argue, seen a pitcher refuse a suggestion.

It is true that I was once accused by an indignant parent of killing originality, of insisting that all ideas be run in the same mold. The onus of this charge rested alike on me and upon a colleague, whose doctrinal solemnity I admit. The originality of expression in question, we held, was chiefly in spelling and punctuation; yet we welcomed the criticism, and watered the young sprout thenceforth with tears of joy. But alas, it never grew; it petrified instead and now lies, beautiful

in death, among the stones of our department of Geology.

Another observation: why is the undergraduate so steadily devoid of humor in expression? Intelligence, indefatigability, are matters of course here; but where shall we find lightness of phrase and spirit? Of course if it be humor to comment in a public print upon the physical peculiarities of named young women, for ours is a co-educational institution, we have it; or to steal stone owls from unfinished buildings. But that is heavy humor; of such innate and deep-rooted, yet perhaps somewhat earthy comicality, I do not speak; nor of that funny story, which so many freshmen know and tell; nor of the frank enjoyment of life, which is often and delightfully voiced. I mean the sort of thing that finds amusement in the perception of the unexpected, interest in the turn of phrase that provokes though it does not challenge the intelligence, a picturesqueness of point of view as far from vulgarity and cynicism on the one hand as it is, if you please, from real wisdom on the other. Why is the undergraduate theme so cataclysmically serious? His is the litany of the literal; or else, his hand on Humor's very throat, he bids him stand and deliver a "joke," or even a "college opera." Bids *him*, I say, conventionally. I might better say *her*, for convention to the contrary, the girls are generally more successful in their humor than the men. It was the girls, for instance, if I am correctly informed, who conceived the idea of having the undergraduates give the Faculty a dinner. Who executed it, I do not know; perhaps it is not yet dead. I am, by the way, reminded by the college paper that "we do not say girls here at —; we say women." What a pity Louisa M. Alcott did not live to know this.

But I am misrepresenting my own attitude toward my experience. There have been many dull moments in it, but I do not feel it as a desert with oases; rather as a journey to the farthest north of youth, of daily monotony but full of diverting and even valuable discoveries. For there is nothing like composition as a discloser of ideas and ideals. Once let the young man take his pen in hand, and his personality shows itself naked. Ink, which conceals the squid, reveals the student. And the personalities revealed, except for the afore-said lack of humor, are on the whole so admirable! Individually many of them are fine, or keen, or even both; collectively, I am besotted enough to think them entrancing. It is not that I find nothing human alien to my interest, but that these young examples of humanity are so various. The study of the loafer alone is worth a man's while. I have had themes late by reason of a janitor's carelessness in mislaying them when he dusted; because a

sister borrowed them to show to a friend; because the hour the student expected to spend in preparation had been used up in getting a long-distance call over the telephone. What conviction has the ordinary excuse now for me? And what strange glimpses I have had of lives! The boy who lay for eighteen hours under the dead body of his mother in Kishineff, until the mob drew off; the girl who wrote of the two men who wished to marry her, pinning their photographs to the paper, and asked me which to choose—those are examples out of literally hundreds that linger in my conscious or subconscious memory. And on the other hand, what a delightful lass was she who defined aesthetic as “something to kill cats with,” and illustrated her definition by the sentence “We gave the cat an aesthetic.” How many years ago did Myron Tremaine—such was his elegant appellation—end a short story thus: “A feature of this girl’s entertainment was the best of wine. One day she put poison in the cup. Thus Gerald Northcote died.”—poor Gerald, who can never die for me.

Over the hummocks of required courses, then, across the smooth and glittering spaces of “electives” that journey to the farthest north of youth has led me, and I am still unfrozen. If I have sometimes wandered in fog, I have had many a bright day’s sledging; if I have never reached the pole, I have at least seen, now and then, the radiant streamers of the aurora borealis; and, thank heaven, my good dogs, Unity, Coherence, and Emphasis, I have never had to eat.

JAMES WEBER LINN.

At the Capitol

IN the incredibly short space of three days, and with almost no debate, the Senate adopted a system of cloture rule which for twenty years it had steadfastly refused to consider. The privilege of unlimited debate, exercised by a few men in a spectacular issue, came back upon its users as a boomerang. But though the effect was electrical, the final influence is not likely to be wholly beneficial. Public opinion has been focused on a single evil—unlimited debate; it has been shown a prescribed remedy—cloture; and it has now seen the plaster applied to the sore. Further medication appears unnecessary. The ship-arming incident has created the impression of a House already efficient, and a Senate which required only the introduction of cloture to render it equally so. Filibustering is dead; an epoch of great snap is approaching.

Any such confidence would be short-sighted. If the public accepts the cloture rule as at all thorough-going, if it is encouraged to believe that even so reformed Congress is not an anachronistic mechanism, there will be a great waste of the resentment that has run so high and is so difficult to arouse. The speed with which the House put through the President’s measure was due not so much to the cloture restrictions of that body as to a special rule reported for the occasion. Ordinarily there is filibustering

in spite of the restrictions. Amendments are always in order, and by moving “to strike out the last word”—a purely pro forma amendment—it is possible to secure the floor and delay the progress of any piece of legislation. On the large appropriation bills, with their many separate clauses, it is particularly easy to hold up matters. Representatives Frear and James, by moving “to strike out the last word” and then “to strike out the last two words,” delayed the passage of the heavily padded Public Buildings bill in the last House, much as the eleven senators held up the ship-arming measure—though the bill came up so early in the session that a vote was inescapable. Frequently it is possible to conduct a filibuster by insisting upon a rigid interpretation of the very rules which are designed to prevent it by blocking a short cut to the action desired by a majority. Members barter “points of order” and “rights to object” much as they barter support of one measure for support of another. The following dialogue, occurring in the last session of the House, shows the obstructive power to be had by insisting upon the regular order:

Mr. Huddleston: I rise to a point of order. Debate is exhausted on the amendment.

Mr. Linthicum: Oh, I hope the gentleman will not do that.

Mr. Huddleston: Why, certainly I will. If I cannot be heard, no one else shall be.

If filibustering is taken to mean the use of dilatory tactics to delay measures of value, then a more serious case arises in the practice of the House to pass or reject most of its important legislation without resorting to a roll-call vote. If the Senate has indulged in unbridled licence in its debate, it has at least insisted that, when quiet was finally had, there be a record vote. The House, however, resolves itself into the Committee of the Whole when a precarious question is presented, and takes action with no record of the individual voting. Behind this parliamentary screen the last House passed a sweeping measure conscripting labor in case of war and refused to ratify an extension of the civil service to higher postmasterships. In either case the result might have been different had the members known that some track was being kept of the way they voted. When publicity is lacking there is every reason for the growth of irresponsibility. The eleven filibustering senators who have been violently denounced must be cynical of a public opinion which has so long tolerated the irresponsible voting of the lower house.

But the real weapon of the filibusters, in both houses, is the committee system. In the Congressional Record each day there appears a statement that “The following bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred” to the proper committee. This is the parliamentary diction for narrating that a large number of typewritten bills were tossed into a wicker basket, never read at all, and sent automatically to a committee room from which most of them would never again see the light of day. Over thirty thousand bills were introduced during the life of the Congress which has just adjourned; and to handle, in committee, his share of this vast total the average member is kept so busy that he is seldom familiar with the bills of any other committee—unless they be his own. The result is that, except in the more spectacular issues, the whole House follows blindly the ruling of its committee. A measure favorably reported is likely to be passed, even if no one except the committee members is aware that it has ever been introduced;

a measure held in committee is seldom inquired about, and even the member who introduced it is inclined to accept tacitly the decision of the oracle.

Obviously some such machinery as the committee system is necessary so long as members of Congress are permitted to introduce thousands of bills covering minor administrative matters. But if the legislative power is to be delegated to the committees, as it very largely is, then it would seem proper to attach a degree of responsibility. At present each committee publishes a vast literature in the course of a session; but it is chiefly a transcript of the hearings, which are in themselves perfunctory. No record whatever is kept of the actual deliberation of the committee or the vote by which the fate of any measure is decided. The result is obvious. Bills that should be enthusiastically enacted into law are safely killed in a committee room with the window-shades down. In settling a point of order during the recent session, Speaker Clark warned the contesting members that "It is absolutely against the rules

of this House to reveal what occurred in the committee room." With the legislative powers so largely in the hands of the committees, this is much as if a cashier should warn his clerks that "It is absolutely against the rules of this bank to reveal what occurs to a depositor's account."

The fact is that filibustering is not confined to the oratory in the Senate chamber, but is spread along the whole course of the congressional system. It is a symptom of much deeper disturbances, and not a surface ailment which can neatly be cured by the enactment of a cloture rule. Basically, the evil arises from the system of government in which leadership is estranged from responsibility, and from the indifference of the constituency to unspectacular situations. Neither of these conditions is to be quickly set right. But the alacrity of the Senate in adopting cloture shows what results are possible under the pressure of a militant public opinion. It should be the aim of progressives not to let that militancy die after expending itself for a crumplet.

C. M.

A COMMUNICATION

The Law and the Facts of "Armed Neutrality"

SIR: If law and reason may still be heard at a time when hysteria beclouds judgment, it may be of interest to discuss briefly, in the light of calm facts and the law, the course that the United States is now pursuing. It is assumed that as good Americans we wish to be legally right in taking warlike steps against another nation and would wish to be so correct that our own country will not be split into hostile camps. To be assured on this point requires a brief examination of the law, which hitherto the metropolitan press has regarded as an annoyance and an obstacle rather than a reason against undertaking illegal measures. My purpose is to inquire to what extent the sinking of the *Laconia* and the so-called Senate filibuster were in fact justifiable motives and reasons for arousing the war spirit and what the legal result of our proposed action in arming ships really is.

The *Laconia* sinking has been said to be murder on the high seas and naturally, therefore, illegal. As a matter of fact the *Laconia* was an armed British vessel, and constructively armed British territory. While it is only natural to feel the greatest pity for persons whose lives are sacrificed in torpedoing of a vessel, those who take passage on armed belligerent vessels are poorly advised. That such a vessel by arming herself assumes the full belligerent status has been made clear by our own Chief Justice Marshall in the case of the *Nereide* (9 Cranch 430). The *Nereide* was an armed British ship which was captured by an American privateer during the war of 1812. In the course of the decision the Chief Justice said, "She is an open and declared belligerent, claiming all the rights and subject to all the dangers of the belligerent character." One of these dangers is that of being fired upon without warning. If, therefore, a passenger sails in an armed British bottom or territory he takes the risk of his location. His rights follow that of the territory on which he is. The fact of his being a neutral cannot enlarge the ship's rights.

This is the plain implication of the law, which was so construed by the British courts in the case of the *Fanny*, in which a neutral cargo on an armed enemy vessel was condemned, whereas under ordinary rules, on an unarmed ship, it would have been free from capture. So much for the status of the *Laconia*. Having guns aboard she forfeited her status as a peaceful merchantman under Marshall's interpretation and the normal rule of law.

That she was armed supposedly for defense and not offense is irrelevant. The true meaning of "armed for defense" has from the beginning been overlooked. As against a belligerent vessel the size or purpose of the armament never made any difference. The distinction was merely employed in neutral ports, so that a ship with a small armament and presumably "armed for defense" was enabled to stay in port more than the twenty-four hours allowed to a vessel armed for offense. The distinction was never heard of as against another belligerent.

The American Line was advised by our State Department some weeks ago that they could legally carry arms and defend themselves against a German submarine, presumably also by firing when a submarine is sighted, as is now proposed in connection with the orders given to our ships to arm. Presumably, the American Line and other neutral owners immediately consulted counsel as to whether they should carry out the authorization of the State Department. They were undoubtedly informed that by arming themselves and employing the guns against the public vessels of a nation with which we are not at war they would become pirates. And yet our State Department openly advised this course—a slight indication to those who may still think calmly of the incompetent advisers in whose hands now lies the fate of the nation.

The twelve senators who manifested an intention not to vote in favor of the Senate bill have been stigmatized as traitors to the country and have had to submit to denunciation at the hands of the President and others—a course difficult to reconcile with our professed love of the right of free speech. The facts, however, ought not to be com-

pletely overlooked. From February 3rd to February 26th the President waited to make his request upon Congress, without a doubt fully knowing what steps he wished to pursue. That long delay has not been explained. On February 26th he came before a Senate with a crowded calendar with a demand for quick action. It is a fair assumption that he believed that with the many appropriation bills before it, his request would be granted without debate, especially as he conveyed an assurance that the step offered a solution against war in the full sense.

The House passed the bill with the emasculation of the portentous words "other instrumentalities." The Senate bill still contained that phrase. Some senators desired to avail themselves of their constitutional rights to debate measures submitted to them and decided to give expression to their views in the Senate. Some declined to waive their constitutional right to participate in the war-making power in favor of the President. Others declined to consent to having naval guns and gunners protect munitions of war going to one belligerent. Others still feared the step would lead to war.

All these grounds were honestly taken and in the main well taken. The evidence shows that less than forty-three hours was consumed in the entire debate, and of this time only approximately half was consumed by the opponents of the bill. Hundreds of less important measures coming before the Senate have been debated much longer without public comment. As a matter of fact, Messrs. Stone, O'Gorman and Kenyon are among the very few men in the country who realized the full legal significance of using government arms and gunners to assist in the transportation of munitions of war to one belligerent. Our neutrality proclamations expressly provide that while citizens may carry arms to one of the belligerents on private account they will not receive the protection of the United States against any punishment or forfeiture inflicted by the other belligerent. There is no more deeply rooted principle in international law than that a neutral government shall not convey or assist in transporting munitions of war to either belligerent. The expression "armed neutrality," therefore, when considered as an official safe conduct and protection for munitions of war or contraband of war, becomes an act of war in the full sense, and Germany or any other belligerent must so regard it. The arming of our ships with the power to fire upon submarines is an act of war, as clearly appears from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Bas v. Tingy* (4 Dallas).

The same principle applies to convoying, for the convoying of ships was expressly permitted only in the case where the convoyed merchantman carried no contraband. Otherwise it was itself an act of war.

If, then, we are to engage in war the people should not be misled by the meaningless phrase "armed neutrality." Nor should the President be permitted to commit the country to war without the issue of peace or war being squarely presented to Congress. On this issue Congress has not yet spoken. Although the Senate rules have now been amended, the President has not availed himself of his power to ask the consent of the Congress to make war, but has decided to act on his own responsibility. The statute of 1819 was limited to an authorization by Congress of defense against

pirates, and the prohibition against firing on public vessels was induced by the knowledge that such an act would be an act of war. The same limitation which then operated on Congress now operates on the President. It is not the statute alone, therefore, which inhibits the President, but the illegality of the President's making war without the consent of Congress.

The arming of our ships with the instruction to fire upon the public vessels of another nation and particularly the use of American guns to assist in conveying munitions of war to one belligerent is an acknowledged violation of neutrality and an act of war. If such a vessel is attacked by a German submarine we cannot plead our righteousness against their illegality as a ground for formal declaration of war. At best our illegality is set off against the German illegality, and we do not come into court with clean hands. Let that issue be squarely presented to the American people and let them decide what our country shall do.

POLONIUS.

[NOTE: An editorial referring to this letter will be found on page 181.—THE EDITORS.]

CORRESPONDENCE

Referendum Solely to Keep Out of War

SIR: In an article on Taking the Referendum Seriously in your issue of February 24th, you state the object of those working for the referendum as being one "to direct attention from the threats of Germany to the illiberalism of those who oppose the referendum." In the name of many whom I know personally as working for the referendum, and I feel safe in saying in the name of thousands of others so working, whom I do not know, I wish to state that our object at this time is solely and simply to keep America out of war and its attendant consequences, because we feel that by entering the war she could attain no result for humanity and herself that she cannot better attain by remaining out.

With this object in view I wish to ask you if the fact that the work of obtaining an advisory referendum would require twenty-five days is not a recommendation that Congress be urged to take such a step before declaring war, if the referendum be upon a clear issue of war or peace? Might not the European war of to-day have been avoided if in each of the now belligerent countries a vote of the people, taking twenty-five days, had been granted before the governments had been allowed to declare war?

As a pacifist I have not imagined for a moment that questions of such detail as you, a liberal, suggest under (a) and (b) would be submitted to the people by Congress. But I do suggest that two straightforward questions on this particular issue, such as the following, might be granted a referendum vote and the result give Congress and the President a definite idea as to what the people desire: 1. Do you think that the United States is justified in entering the present European conflict upon any provocation excepting armed invasion of our territory and a declaration of war upon us? 2. Do you favor our delaying demand for reparation for any injury done to America incidental to the present war until the war is over?

There, it seems to me, are two questions to be answered

by yes or no, which would give Congress exact knowledge as to how its constituency wished it to act during the present war, and yet would give it the necessary control over detail as to enable it to carry out those wishes most effectively.

Regarding the "furious campaign" which you feel would be carried on by those "for and against," I can conceive of nothing more wholesome at this time, nothing which would more instantly clear the atmosphere of uncertainty and hesitancy, than for the American people to be faced by a direct question of war or peace. Personally, I can conceive of nothing which could be less conducive to a sane settlement of things than the present situation in which exist a hundred kinds of pacifism, and a hundred kinds of militarism, each sending forth its propaganda and its questionnaire to confuse the popular mind. What we need imperatively at this time, it seems to me, is a question put to us, as a people, which may be answered by yes or no, and whose answer will denote whether we wish America to enter this war or not. I understand of course that such a question might make it less comfortable for the liberals "who love peace," and "who would wish to call themselves pacifists" than for any one else, as it would take from under their feet the middle ground upon which they now stand, and force them to join either the Roosevelt or the Bryan camp, or else to be silent in a great federal crisis.

And finally as to the referendum being a proposal from "irresponsible minds," "poverty of imagination," and lack of "realistic thinking," there is no way of proving anything either for or against this statement now, but I, for one, am willing to abide by the test of time and perspective upon the issue, as answer to this accusation.

NELL VINCENT.

New York City.

From the Department of Agriculture

SIR: In an article, entitled *Agricultural Mobilization*, in your issue of February 24th, you state:

For a generation our agricultural output has failed to keep pace with the growth of population. . . .

Unless we prepare against it, the disparity between agricultural production and the demand for food will become increasingly acute.

I am afraid that, in common with many others, *The New Republic* has been misled or misinformed about the present state of agricultural production in the United States. We are in no real danger from low output; rather the danger comes from bad marketing and inefficient distribution. Secretary Houston's last annual report presents statistics of our food supply covering sixteen years and leading to the conclusion:

" . . . that, notwithstanding the very rapid increase in population, the production per capita of the commodities indicated, with the exception of meats and dairy products, has remained approximately the same or has increased. . . . With all the agencies now available for improving agriculture there is ground for optimism as to the ability of the nation not only to supply itself with food, but increasingly to meet the needs of the world."

With much of what you say regarding agricultural mobilization I am in hearty agreement—but trust this

already sufficiently complicated issue will not be clouded by a misunderstanding of the facts. Our problem of food preparedness is not essentially a problem of adding to our national supply. It is a problem of seeing to it that our national food supply shall be so marketed that the poor and unfortunate shall not be exploited and starved by disloyal food speculators. With almost no exceptions that cannot be taken care of easily, the United States, so far as quantity is concerned, is in an extremely enviable position.

CARL VROOMAN,
Assistant Secretary.

Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D. C.

[NOTE: We submit that Secretary Houston's exceptions—meat and dairy products—are most important exceptions, and that however large our supply may be at the moment, we shall not be in a position properly to distribute it or to guard against its future depletion unless our agricultural census is up to date and we are in a position properly to mobilize our resources. The real danger, it seems to us, is that the derangements of a bad system will be overlooked in an agitation solely directed against speculators.—THE EDITORS.]

Prefers Maritime Anarchy

SIR: Your article entitled *Justification* in the issue of February 10th says, in effect, that the United States is justified in entering the war aggressively on the side of the Allies in order that undiminished control of the seas may be preserved for Great Britain; that, inasmuch as the United States has profited hitherto by this control, it is against our interests for the control to be in other hands.

The fact that a despotism has been exercised benevolently towards us makes it none the less a despotism. Nor does it carry with it any promise that the benevolent attitude will be maintained.

If, as you state, one may hope that after the war "conflicting national interests can be adjusted and a body of international right defined, accepted and applied," why, in heaven's name, should we take this opportunity further to intrench Great Britain in her absolute sea control? For if Great Britain comes out of the war with this control intact, nothing on earth is going to persuade her to give it up. She will still continue to wield it—benevolently perhaps—but none the less despotically; for on her sea power depends, in her mind, her very existence—existence which had been endangered by Germany's dispute of it.

Wresting this power from her does not automatically deliver it into the hands of Germany. It creates maritime anarchy for a moment, perhaps; but it is easier to rebuild from anarchy something nearer to our hearts' desire than achieve the same result when the result runs counter to self-interest—self-interest which has become all the more certain of itself.

It is distasteful for us to believe that the United States must depend for important privileges on the goodwill of any nation, no matter how kindly that nation may be disposed. If Great Britain's grip can be loosened and all nations step in and demand a copartnership on the high seas, this difficulty will be obviated. Certainly, chances for future war will be materially decreased.

MERRILL ROGERS.

New York City.

After the Play

WALTER BAGEHOT'S English Constitution is admired for many reasons. I like it because in certain spots it is so candidly sordid. Bagehot really cared for the ruling class and he took pains to speak to it in terms that were almost Germanly frank. An "ignorant multitude" had received the franchise in 1867, and Bagehot warned the House of Lords that he was exceedingly afraid of that ignorant multitude. He did not disguise his policy about it. "I wish to have as great and as compact a power as possible to resist it." And he urged the organization of that power in a passage so packed with worldly wisdom that it deserves to be memorized by every aërial youth.

"In all countries," Bagehot explained, "new wealth is ready to worship old wealth, if old wealth will only let it, and I need not say that in England new wealth is eager in its worship. Satirist after satirist has told us how quick, how willing, how anxious are the newly-made rich to associate with the ancient rich. Rank probably in no country whatever has so much 'market' value as it has in England just now. Of course there have been many countries in which certain old families, whether rich or poor, were worshipped by whole populations with a more intense and poetic homage; but I doubt if there has ever been any in which all old families and all titled families received more ready observance from those who were their equals, perhaps their superiors, in wealth, their equals in culture, and their inferiors only in descent and rank. The possessors of the 'material' distinctions of life, as a political economist would class them, rush to worship those who possess the immaterial distinctions. *Nothing can be more politically useful than such homage, if it be skilfully used; no folly can be idler than to repel and reject it.*"

The aristocracy ought to be the heads of the plutocracy—that was Walter Bagehot's conviction in the fewest possible words. It is a conviction worth recalling in connection with a new comedy by W. Somerset Maugham, just produced in New York and suitably entitled, *Our Betters*; for Mr. Maugham's inquisition is precisely into the process by which newly-made wealth, so quick and willing and anxious, was to come to associate with rank. It is American plutocracy whose homage Mr. Maugham sees being utilized, but this is a minor and piquant difference, and scarcely affects the exposition of the principle that the eminent Bagehot laid down.

It is some years now since Mr. Roosevelt offered his censure of the American girl who becomes a foreign princess. Mr. Maugham is bitter about this American invasion of the European Vanity Fair, but curiously enough he is much more bitter about the callous English attitude than about the crude American effort to buy a holding in the leisure class. On that nice question as to the briber and the bribed, Mr. Maugham seems to look on the English bribe-taker as the more unworthy and despicable; and every decent American in the play speaks with tears in his voice of "simple, wholesome New York." Lady Grayston, the titled American, who has spent her life making two peers dine where only one dined before, pauses in the adventure long enough to confess that her Amazon victories cost her dear. If the English yield an inch, she declares bitterly, they exact their blood-money. Their basic law is "something for nothing." Mr. Maugham leaves little doubt as to his agreeing with her.

This is an acrid comedy. Mr. Maugham has picked

out a titled American woman of the keen, smart, fast, unscrupulous kind at whose house in Mayfair one meets the male expatriate who is trying to live down his origin; the duchess de Surennes, née Hodgson, Chicago; the princess della Cercola, née Hollis, Boston; and an American capitalistic "man of iron." There is scarcely a single disreputable feature of scum-life that Mr. Maugham does not exhibit among these hyphenated Anglo-Americans. Lady Grayston's husband never appears in the play. She herself lives beyond her means and continually bleeds her friend, the American promoter, working him sensually and sentimentally for the extra money she requires. He considers it a "privilege" to love her, boasts of her egregiously, and calls her "girlie" to his infinite joy. The duchess de Surennes is an eat-and-grow-thin, middle-aged Chicagoan, who has divorced her Gaston and become infatuated with an English weakling, aged 25, a person who pays to her only such respect as is due to one's all too visible means of support. The sad princess has no such foible. She also has divorced her titled husband, but her marriage was a young girl's mistake, and now she is giving to organized charity what was meant for a husband and is only living in London because she found herself treated as an alien on returning to Boston. An impudent Cockney dancing-master is an indulged favorite of this circle, and the only other Englishman is a young English lord who is needed for Lady Grayston's younger sister, a girl who has just made the pilgrimage from Nineteenth street, New York, to Mecca. She has only \$1,000,000, but the lord is not a very expensive lord.

With all these precious Americans on his hands, Mr. Maugham is rather at a loss what to do with them. He has a real perception of the general ugliness and dirtiness of their situation, but has no particularly illustrative incident of it at his command. The poor best he can manage is to have the jealous duchess expose an intrigue. Her lap-dog escapes from the leash. He is trapped in a garden tea-house with his hostess, on the night of the country-house week-end; but the tone of the group is already so low that this is like salting the ocean. The last act shows a group of actors bereaved. It is Lady Grayston's unimportant business to wind up the affairs of the lamented plot; to placate her disillusioned sister and bring round the duchess and win back the man of iron. Too easily does the duchess arrange to marry her lover with a forlorn hope of keeping him, too obviously and cheaply does Lady Grayston persuade her Napoleon of the tram business or jam business or whatever he is that to err is human, to forgive divine. The actors make shame-faced burlesque of it, and the only serious touch is the sister's decision to leave sordid England and return to simple, wholesome New York.

Apart from the appearance of Miss Rose Coghlan, as the duchess; Mr. Ronald Squire as the lap-dog; Miss Crystal Herne as Lady Grayston, Mr. Fritz Williams as the expatriate, Miss Leonore Harris as the princess and Mr. John Flood as the strong American, the comedy adds an interest to present New York productions by reason of its sharp recognition of a genuine theme. Mr. Maugham has the gift of subacid smart talk, and if he had made his story less banal *Our Betters* could have been described as a strong satiric comedy, with a general bias in favor of regarding endowed hyphenate marriage as a subdivision of the white slave traffic not generally recognized.

F. H.

Mr. Wells at the War

Italy, France and Britain at War, by H. G. Wells. New York: The Macmillan Company.

THERE are a few rather obvious large classes in which those who are discussing the war may be grouped. There are those who seem to be completely mobilized like Mr. Kipling, for example. He conceives it is the function of literature in wartime to work in the Department of National Morale. Writers are to supply the brass bands, the pennants, the fighting chaplains, the historical memories of a modern nation in arms. There are those, and they shall be nameless here, who put their former reputation for truth-telling at the disposal of government, and write apologetics. They explain away. They put an air of reasonableness and humanity on everything. They become enormously gregarious, and the more you read them the less you know. They sacrifice everything to conformity, imagining that to think ahead, to think drastically while their nation is beset, is to create unnecessary confusion. There are writers like M. Maeterlinck, whose whole recorded utterance, as in *The Wrack of the Storm*, could be expressed more poignantly by an agonized peasant of Flanders clenching his fist in the ruins of his home. There are of course the reporters who in conjunction with the cinema enable the stay-at-homes to visualize and feel and smell the battlefield. There are those like Mr. Bernard Shaw who have insisted at great personal cost on keeping alive that part of the free tradition which consists in the willingness to outrage the mores of a people at war. There is the elegant dialectic, the unsoiled, high-headed mixture of disdain and pity in men like Mr. Bertrand Russell and M. Romain Rolland. Practically all leave the reader very little the wiser as to how to fight the war or how to end it or what to do about the gigantic novelties it has introduced into human life.

Mr. Wells, it seems to me, has outlined himself against all others who are writing about the war in English to-day by the usefulness of his mental activity. There are many who have thought out far more accurately than he has attempted intricate portions of the great problem—the nationality tangle of southeastern Europe for example, or the future of maritime control, or the politics and machinery of a league of peace. A few solitary men have stood their ground more stubbornly against the onset of unreason, but none, I think, has actually gone to the war, looked it so honestly in the face and brought back so much insight and wide-ranging practical speculation.

I believe it is because none has gone out so well equipped. How, for example, could M. Maeterlinck get wisdom as well as anguish from his country's tragedy, when he confesses in the introduction to his book that previous to this war he had written no word of ill-will about any man? A man could hardly expect to comprehend the German assault if he had spent all the earlier parts of his life whispering piously among the immaterial shadows. Nor would one expect intellectual leadership from Mr. Kipling who never has looked at the modern industrial state. But Mr. Wells, who has been up and down the social scale, who has been in laboratories and machine shops as well as drawing rooms, is educated to this war. He can go to the western front and perceive as a revelation the contrast between the obsolete spurs on the boots of officers and the collectivism of the munition-making.

The real genius of this book is that the immensity of what he saw on his visit to the front set his mind working,

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instead of striking it dumb. He discovered the effects of class rule and literary education, of conservatism and aristocracy obstructing warfare on the Somme front as they obstruct social efficiency in New York or Chicago. He was under no delusion that patriotism covered every sin. And as you read his description of military minds which were still oblivious to scientific method and the processes of industrialism, you will shudder at the prospect of an American expeditionary corps commanded by men who have fought Spaniards at San Juan Hill.

There is a phrase in this book which represents a piece of very great perception. Mr. Wells speaks of the demilitarization of war. Some of us had already grasped the fact vaguely that there must be industrial back of military preparedness. We visualized it as "back of." But what the war on the west front seems to show is an irresistible industrialization of army management itself. Modern warfare from iron mine to the front trench is an economic society engaged in an engineering operation. The management has passed to railroad directors, food directors, metallurgists, foremen. It may be that the older militarism will reappear if the war of positions is resolved into open warfare. But in the deadlock of the last two years militarism and industrialism seem to have become almost indistinguishable. War is not waged by an army which has gone out to fight battles, but by an industrial system organized for destruction instead of for profit.

What this seems to promise for the future is "not so much the conversion of men into soldiers as the socialization of the economic organization of the country with a view to both national and international necessities. We do not want to turn a chemist or a photographer into a

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little figure like a lead soldier, moving mechanically at the word of command, but we do want to make his chemistry or photography swiftly available if the national organization is called upon to fight. We have discovered that the modern economic organization is in itself a fighting machine." Allowing for the possible overstatement that accompanies a brilliant perception, there is here a truth which will, I think, revolutionize much of our theorizing about democracy and socialism and national preparedness and internationalism. The old absolutes in which we have talked so long about these things are rendered curiously obsolete by the experience of the war. The collectivism which was to make people pacific has proved to be the greatest fighting engine man ever devised. War, which was to swallow up industrial reconstruction has been partially swallowed in its turn. I do not mean to imply that collectivism can only be used for destruction, or that the appearance of it will end destruction. Both guesses go way beyond the facts. But I do suspect that this national collectivism, so deadly in war, so full of benign possibilities for peace, so capable of being used for a war after the war, is a phenomenon in human society of which most of our social science is only dimly aware.

W. L.

Heine and Jones

"The North Sea," by Heinrich Heine. Translated by Howard Mumford Jones, Chicago. The Open Court Publishing Co., \$1.00.

M. R. JONES'S translation of Heine's *The North Sea* is, by all odds, the best translation of this sonorous series that has yet appeared. And yet it is typical of the versions, not only of this sequence but of almost all the translated poems of Heine, in its lack of something that is deeper than erudition or accuracy. This vital quality that is missing from the array of Heine collections from Charles Godfrey Leland's down to John Todhunter's is not merely verbal grace but an almost complete ignorance of the spirit behind the words. Or, instead of ignorance, let me say it is distaste. Not conscious repugnance exactly; but a desire not to see what seems to be vulgar or petty or poisonous in Heine, an effort to turn his rude laughter into refined badinage—in short, to prettify him into a pseudo-romantic, graceful and usually sentimental lyric poet. These interpreters attempt to appreciate the poems of Heine without appreciating Heine himself. And in their failure to approximate or even to want to understand the man, lies the secret of their failure to understand the poet and the poet's work.

This refusal to accept Heine as he was, with his mockery, his outspokenness, his bursts of coarseness and pain interrupting his most limpid and ethereal moments, is the reason why most of the versions, aside from their many technical absurdities, are, even when they are fairly readable, very dull reading. Most of the translators have taken up the work in their most professional manner; they have approached Heine not only as pedagogs, but as pedagogs approaching a talented, ill behaved and generally inexplicable undergraduate. Here and there a kindly professor has blinked an eye rather than witness an undignified prank; another has closed his ears to episodes too bitter or racy for the class-room, but the attitude has been almost always that of smiling, superior condemnation. Either they condemned Heine's own utterances with silence, or

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


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
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negated them with corrective notes and explanatory apologies. Unable, by their soft and coddled traditions, to face the storm of Heine's mood—his wild mixture of naïveté and disillusion, of tenderness and brutality—they slurred over and devitalized whatever was too rude or untutored for their academic taste. The result is the usual tasteless volume with nothing to remind one of the original but the bare design of a story, an occasionally brilliant line buried in banalities, and, at best, a sense of something struggling beneath a weight of scholasticism, bad English verse and a few hundred tortured inversions. Mr. Jones is less at fault in this regard than most of his predecessors; but even he cannot resist the temptation to put Heine in his place occasionally. One feels that Mr. Jones makes as many allowances as he can for the offender; he even sympathizes with some of his lapses of good manners; but really, he seems to say, one must draw the line somewhere, mustn't one, even in poetry?

And so, following the mawkish Herr Ernst Elster's lead, Mr. Jones omits the entire poem *Seckrankheit* (Sea-Sickness), one of Heine's most brilliant satirical attacks on Germany. Worse than that, he leaves off the last and most important half of *Frieden* (Peace), in which Heine's scorn of the poet-commercialists and literary prostitutes of his day rises to ironic heights. Mr. Jones explains his omission in the following graceful note:

"A concluding section of *Peace* is in the Elster edition omitted, and this omission I am glad to follow. The section was added as an afterthought, and has all the horrible bad taste of a cold and reasoned sneer."

One wonders what Mr. Jones would say to certain lyrics in *Die Heimkehr*; to *Donna Clara*, which is like a story of Rabelais versified by John Keats; to some of the stinging but light-hearted songs in *Seraphine* and *Angelique*, for instance.

This over-niceness extends to the translations themselves; he refines the life out of a line by substituting a proper word for a powerful, or, as Mr. Jones might say, an improper one. Take the passage where Heine is describing, in *Die Nacht am Strande*, a simple fisher-maid half-undressed in front of the fire. He pictures her face reflecting the flames and her soft, white shoulders shining strangely from the thick, gray garment: "Aus dem groben, grauen Hemde."

Thus Mr. Jones:

"That peer so piteously

From her coarse and faded costume."

Now "Hemde" is a shirt, a smock, a chemise; it is not, except to an over-delicate mind, a "costume." In Mr. Jones's line one loses not only the poignance of the picture but the picture itself. The life goes out of it; it becomes conventionalized, stilted, artificial. The fisher-girl becomes related to something in a comic opera; her "costume" calls up knee-skirts, a property butterfly-net and high-heeled patent-leather slippers.

This fidelity to both spirit and letter is the chief difficulty in the translation of Heine. To translate all of the colloquialisms word for word, is often to have an English version that is flat, awkward, banal. To remedy this prosiness, the translator usually tries circumlocution, adds a few decorative phrases, embellishes the language to make it "poetic"—and at once the very simplicity that distinguishes the poem, the direct speech that is the idiom and heart of Heine, is lost. The skilful translator must somehow steer a middle course. He must know not merely what to reject

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but what to accept. And, more than this, his labor must be pursued with an almost religious humility. I do not mean that he should treat Heine either as a classic or a god (for the task of the translator is to assemble the contradictory elements of Heine the man), but he must never forget how small his own virtues are next to Heine's most flagrant literary vices.

Barring this tendency to emasculate, Mr. Jones keeps to the German very faithfully. Too faithfully, at times; for, in his effort to keep the exact syllabic stress of these polyrhythmic lines, he sometimes has to substitute a weak word for a strong one. Or, as in the case of so suggestive and rushing a word as "meerdurchrauschen," he is forced to compromise on a short phrase that could have been much more powerful had he given himself an extra foot or two. It is imperative to keep the exact beat and length of line in Heine's lyrics or his blank verse; but in those precursors of modern *vers libre* it would have been better here and there to adhere less strictly to the syllables, to give the effect of Heine's music on a larger scale rather than in the same restricted compass.

But, all these qualifications aside, the book is valuable for lovers of German literature as well as for students. No other version approaches it in its thorough attention to detail and, now and then, in its grasp of the vaguer essentials of the original. Besides this, there is an introduction that is, in itself, a fine creative piece of writing. It is a hard thing to say, but one gets a better picture of Heine from Mr. Jones's preface than from his translation. But this is not so much a deprecation of Mr. Jones's paraphrase as it is a tribute to his skill as an original and often penetrative critic. At least there is nothing squeamish about his prose.

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Heures de Guerre de la Famille Valadier. Par Abel Hermant. Paris: Librairie Alphonse Lemerre.

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to the general politeness. It struck him that all the courtesy of an older day had suddenly come back. Quoting Talleyrand's phrase that "No one who has not lived in the last days of the old régime can know the sweetness of life," he says:

"I could not be quite so positive as regards Sunday, September 6, 1914: it might be an exaggeration; but the Parisians who remained true to Paris really tasted on that day a sort of *douceur de vivre*, oddly made up of patriotic anxiety, stoicism and a secret confidence that they would not have to draw upon either their courage or their resignation, and so would have all the merit of the thing and none of the troubles. Everybody was in good humor and the weather was wonderful. . . . I bought six of the evening papers, handed them round, and we all read together the *communiqué*. It was the one that announced that the German army seemed to neglect the entrenched camp of Paris. This little phrase, so full of meaning, gave us great joy and not the least surprise; it answered purely and simply, I will not say to our hope, but to our inmost certainty. We raised our eyes and exchanged only a glance, full, however, of as much meaning as the little phrase; and for the first time since the beginning of the war M. Valadier omitted his accustomed commentary on the *communiqué*."

M. Valadier's commentaries on the daily *communiqués* were one of the things that attached the narrator to the household. Each commentary was a lesson in all the humanities. Never was a page of Virgil or Bossuet or Racine searched more thoroughly for hidden beauties. He studied it as an epigraphist works out an inscription, experimenting with the punctuation marks, looking for a double meaning, till he found finally what he sought. This was exactly what he and everybody else wanted to find. At the bottom of any despatch there was something that conformed to the desires of everybody, and it was precisely this that M. Valadier always brought to light. Mme. Valadier always raised her hands in wonder: he was a divine being, that husband of hers. But in general the reason why the Valadier household was so perfect a refuge was that in all respects it provided a shelter from actualities. Not only did it glow with optimism—optimism that was always reasoned out by M. Valadier and made perfectly plausible—but ever since Emma, the oldest daughter, had developed a talent for the stage every other member of the family had been stage mad. M. Valadier resigned his professorship in history, read plays, and absorbed their language to such a degree that he spoke it unconsciously in all his daily affairs. Mme. Valadier was not only the mother of an actress. She had become the typical mother of actresses. Of the two other children, the youngest, a girl of twelve, talked always in classical tragedy, while the son, who by nature and good management possessed a sort of scenic good looks, was always the leading juvenile.

"'Is it today or tomorrow, oh Lucien,' said M. Valadier, 'that you yield to the shears your beautiful locks?'"

"I recognized the words, but could not recall where they came from. Luckily, M. Valadier, who often employs quotations, always gives his references.

"'It was in that way, or nearly so,' said he, 'that Socrates spoke to the young Phaedo.'"

The parting with Lucien when he went to join his regiment was at once touching and classical:

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But to a certain extent people were impelled everywhere to play a part and could not quite give way to natural impulse. The Valadier boarder watched them all as they said good-bye at the station, mothers, wives, mistresses, younger lads, little children, in the open air under everybody's eye, with never a cry or a murmur. It was a sort of fortitude that would not be kept up in solitude, he thought, but became possible only by sharing it, by example and "by the aid of a magnificent publicity." That last phrase, by the way, will set some people to thinking again about the proverbial French vanity. If Stendhal were alive he probably would revise those invectives of his on French vanity, seeing the uses to which French vanity can be put.

All this merely shows the setting and the spirit of the little book. It would be a pity to spoil anybody's pleasure in reading it by telling how it turns out. And, after all, the main point is not where it goes to, but how it goes. M. Abel Hermant is not a wonderful person or a profound, and he has no illusions whatever on the subject, being content to think that he is not more *bête*, as he says, than most people. But in default of world-solutions and mankind-shaking thoughts he applies himself to expressing well that which he does see and conceive. In short, *il cultive son jardin*, a French measure of literary domestic economy which American popular fiction might copy with advantage, for be it understood that when fiction is popular with us it is never written in M. Abel Hermant's manner and M. Abel Hermant is quite popular in France. If the above summaries and illustrations do not bring out this international verity, it is merely the fault of the reviewer's clumsy hand.

FRANK M. COLBY.

Contributors

to this issue

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
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